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This descriptive analysis details and explains often paradoxical contacts between Russian and 
Russia-related actors, on the one side, and post-Soviet Ukrainian far-right parties such as Svoboda 
(Freedom), the National Corps, the Right Sector, and Bratstvo (Brotherhood), as well as of some 
other ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, on the other. The investigation also covers Ukrainian far 
right connections to Moscow-related Ukrainian oligarchs, the Yanukovych regime of 2010-2014, 
and other Kremlin-r
ultra-nationalist parties and then details contacts of Ukrainian right-wing extremists with various 
Russian ultra-nationalist groups, pro-Russian actors in Ukraine, as well as with Kremlin-related 
actors in Russia. It finally briefly examines the cooperation of Ukraine's far-right with non-
Russian mostly European Union actors who have voiced pro-Putinist views or collaborated with 
Russia. The study uses primary and secondary sources in the Ukrainian, Russian, English, and 
German languages. These sources include press reports, party documents, interviews, previous 
analyses, and investigations by agencies such as Bellingcat. The introduction and conclusions 
provide some historical contextualization and political interpretation of this paradoxical aspect in 
the evolution of the Ukrainian far right. 
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Introduction: The Purposes of this Study 
 
This investigation outlines the recent history and possible causes of contacts between what appear 
to be two antagonistic and antinomic forces: Ukrainian ultra-nationalist groups and Russian or pro-
Kremlin actors, associations, and institutions.1 The primary dividing line and crux of the deep 
conflict between  both, moderate and radical  Russian and Ukrainian nationalisms lies in the 
mostly imperial and partly messianic character of Russian ethnocentric thought and the obsession 
2 Many 
Russian people not only ultranationalists believe that there is no properly developed, united, or 
sufficiently distinct Ukrainian ethnos. Thus parts, most or all of Ukraine should be formally or 
select factions within radical Russian nationalism fully accept and properly respect Ukraine as a 
separate and distinct nation from Russia and recognize its political sovereignty as well as 
internationally recognized borders. 
 
Another issue that separates sections within and between different camps of Russian and Ukrainian 
nationalisms is their stance towards Europe and the West. Most Ukrainian nationalists, including 
many of the more radical ones, are decidedly pro-European. And much of Ukrainian moderate 
nationalism is loudly pro-Western. In contrast, most Russian nationalists tend to be anti-Western 
(especially anti-American) and some sections are partly or fully anti-European. This division, 
however, is not clear-cut. There are strands within both moderate and radical Russian nationalists, 
including some groups with racist ideologies, who see Russia as belonging to a wider European, or 
nationalists are as illustrated in this study relatively pro-Ukraine. For instance, they may see the 
 
1 Larger surveys on post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism and far right politics include, in chronological order: 
Volodymyr Kulyk,  
bezpeky NaUKMA, 1999); Taras Kuzio, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism: New 
Directions in Cross-Cultural and Post-Communist Studies (Stuttgart: ibidem-
ekstremisty vo vremia i posle vosstaniia 2013- Forum noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i 
13:1 (2013): 103- -Soviet Ukrainian Right- Russian 
Politics & Law 51:5 (2013): 3
in Past and Present: Stud Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48:2 3 
(2015): 169 271; Vitaliy Nakhmanovych, 
sotsiolohii Pravyi radykalizm v Ukrayini (Cherkasy: Tretiakov 
2016 roky) (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2021). 
2 Larger recent surveys on post-Soviet Russian nationalism and far right politics include, in chronological 
 (Moskva: 
Academia, 2004); Aleksandr Verkhovskii, ed., Tsena nenavisti: Natsionalizm v Rossii i protivodestvie rasistskim 
prestupleniiam (Moskva: SOVA, 2005); idem, ed., Russkii natsionalizm: ideologiia i nastroenie (Moskva: SOVA, 
2006); idem, ed., Verkhi i nizy russkogo natsionalizma (Moskva: SOVA, 2007); Marlene Laruelle, ed., Le Rouge 
et le noir: Extrême droite et nationalisme en Russie (Paris: CNRS-Éditions, 2007); idem, ed., Sovremennye 
interpretatsii russkogo natsionalizma (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007); idem, ed., Russkii natsionalizm v 
politicheskom prostranstve: Issledovaniia po natsionalizmu v Rossii  (Moskva: Franko-rossiiskii tsentr 
gumanitarnykh i obshchestvennykh nauk, 2007); idem, ed., 
kontekst (Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2008); idem, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and 
Politics in Contemporary Russia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); idem, ed., Russian Nationalism and the 
National Reassertion of Russia (London: Routledge, 2009); Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of 
Russi  (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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Ukrainian nation as a legitimate participant and equal partner in the international concert of 
 
 
Most Russian nationalists, however, see Russia as a distinct Orthodox and/or Eurasian civilization 
that is separate from, or even opposite to, the West. In contrast, Ukrainian nationalists are largely 
oriented westwards rather than towards Russia or other countries to its east (with the partial 
exception of Georgia, often seen as a close ally of Ukraine). This diversion in foreign outlook creates 
additional tension between Russian and Ukrainian nationalists who may otherwise be able to find a 
common conceptual language.  
 
Whether conservative or revolutionary, all integral nationalist ideologies  
 are, to one degree or another, ethno-centric, anti-individualistic, traditionalist, 
patriarchal, and illiberal. Thus they tend to be similarly structured and have potential points of 
agreement that can lead to transnational cooperation or even joint organization. Yet Russian and 
Ukrainian nationalist worldviews are different not only and not so much in their ideational and 
philosophical substance.  
 
As indicated, most Ukrainian and Russian nationalists are in fundamental conflict regarding their 
larger geopolitical outlooks and territorial aspirations. Many Russian nationalists do not respect 
towards Western civilization and, to a lesser degree, the European Idea. On the other side, there are 
some Ukrainian nationalists who  especially after the events of 2014  claim southern parts of the 
mosity between Russian 
and Ukrainian nationalists.  
 
Despite an apparently fundamental impossibility of cooperation, there have been several contacts 
between certain Ukrainian radical right groups and Russian or non-Russian pro-Kremlin actors. 
Some relationships go back to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In this paper, we illustrate different 
forms, motivations, and spectra of paradoxical interaction of these supposedly opposite poles in 
East European geopolitics. We list not only the relevant facts of their cooperation, but also try to 
explain why and how such mostly counter-intuitive collaboration became possible and, in some 
instances, continued on after the Revolution of Dignity as well as start of the Russian-Ukrainian war 
in 2014.3  
 
As already indicated in the title, we do not address here intra-nationalist cooperation within 
-paradoxical international ties, like its links 
to equally anti-Russian Baltic ultra-nationalists. And finally, we do not cover the frequent 
-nationalist groups with Ukrainian patriotic persons, state actors 
(ministries, parliamentary factions, agencies, etc.) or with moderate nationalists in the Ukrainian 
party-political, civil society, and cultural realms. To be sure, cases of such formal or informal 
collaboration between centrists and extremists within Ukraine have been legion since 1991. We 
acknowledge that these ties and alliances are larger and more politically relevant than the episodes 
of Ukrainian ultra-nationalist collaboration outlined in this paper.  
 
While there are thus good reasons to write papers and books on intra-nationalist cooperation 
or/and patriotic NGOs, on the other, this paper has different aims. Our aim is to present when and 
 




how Ukrainian far right groups (or certain circles posing as members of the far right) have 
collaborated with actors who either appear as puzzling partners or who are fundamentally odd 
allies for Russophobic Ukrainian ultra-nationalists. While this focus may omit other interesting 
instances of cooperation, it provides us with a chance to hone in on the most putatively or 
substantively paradoxical instances of a particular type of domestic and external cooperation 
between Ukr -nationalist groups and actors outside the Ukrainian far-right spectrum. 
 
A satisfactory outline of the entire gamut of both conventional and paradoxical cases of 
collaboration of Ukrainian radically nationalist groups with various moderate or foreign partners 
would result in a rather thick volume. It would, perhaps, demand a team of more than two 
researchers to provide such a comprehensive overview. That is why this study only addresses 
Ukrainian far right cooperation with Russian actors and with seemingly or actually pro-Kremlin 




The Ukrainian Far-Right Scenery since 1991 
Post-Soviet Ukraine has an organizationally and ideologically well-developed, yet electorally weak 
family of far- -right party spectrum started to emerge 
already in the late 1980s and have since given birth to an array of different groupings and 
alliances.4 In spite of their early emergence and continuous presence, the performance of far-right 
parties and alliances in national votes has been largely abysmal (Table 1).5 Only in the 2012 
Ukrainian parliamentary elections did Svoboda perform relatively well, and this happened under 
special circumstances, which we will discuss later.6 
Table 1. Vote shares of major Ukrainian far right parties in the presidential and proportional parts of 
the parliamentary elections in 1998-2019 (in percent).7 
Party or alliance Natsionalnyy front  
[National Front] (KUN, UKRP 
& URP) / URP / KUN 




Words] (VPO-DSU & SNPU) / 
VOS 
National election 
1998 (parliamentary) 2.71 (NF) 0.39 (UNA) 0.16 (MS) 
1999 (presidential) 
2002 (parliamentary) 0.04 (UNA) 
2004 (presidential) 0.02 (Kozak, OUN) 0.17 
2006 (parliamentary) 0.06 (UNA) 0.36 (VOS) 
2007 (parliamentary) 0.76 (VOS) 
2010 (presidential) 1.43 (Tiahnybok) 
2012 (parliamentary) 0.08 (UNA-UNSO) 10.44 (VOS) 
2014 (presidential) 0.70 (Yarosh)* 1.16 (Tiahnybok) 
2014 (parliamentary) 0.05 (KUN) 1.81 (PS) 4.71 (VOS) 
2019 (presidential) 
2019 (parliamentary) 2.15 (VOS)** 
* In the 2014 presidential election, Dmytro Yarosh was formally running as an independent candidate, yet he
was publicly known as the leader of the Pravyy sector (Right Sector  PS).
** In fact, the 2019 Svoboda list was a unified bloc of most of the relevant Ukrainian far right political parties,
but it was officially registered as a list only of the VOS.
Abbreviations: KUN [Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists], UKRP 
[Ukrainian Conservative Republican party], URP 
[Ukrainian Republican Party], VPO-DSU  Vseukrainske politychne 
[All-
Ukrain  Sotsial-natsionalna partiia Ukrainy [Social-National Party of Ukraine], OUN  Orhanizatsiia 
4 RFE/RL Research Report 3:16 (1994): 42-
Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 
1989- Nationalities Papers 25:2 (1997): 211- Paramilitarni struktury 
ukrainskoho natsionalistychnoho rukhu 90-
 30 (2011): 42-51. 
5 Melanie Mierzejewski- - The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 608-629. 
6 orat, 2012- The Ideology and Politics 
Journal, no. 2(4) (2013): 8-92. 
7 -Wing Extremisms of Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 1991-2014:
Hypotheses on Differences in Their Permut
Contemporary Ukraine, University of Ottawa, 2 November. 
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ukrainskykh natsionalistiv [Organization of Ukrainian Nationaists], UNA   
[Ukrainian National Assembly], UNSO  Ukrains  [Ukrainian National Self-Defense], 
VOS  [All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda]. 
 
Ukrainian Far-Right Political Parties 
 
Ukrainian National Assembly Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) 
 
The political party Ukrainian National Assembly Ukrainian National Self-Defense, known by its 
Ukrainian acronym UNA-UNSO, is the oldest significant ultra-nationalist grouping in post-Soviet 
Ukraine.8 The UNA-UNSO has its origins in the early 1990s when it grew out of two minor groups 
with pretentious names, the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly (UMA) and the Ukrainian National 
Union (UNS).9 These groups had become known for helping to protect the Lithuanian Parliament 
when Soviet army units stormed the Vilnius TV tower in 1991.10 In addition, members from the 
ranks of the UNS were involved in counteracting the attempted putsch in Moscow in August 1991.11 
The emerging  (Ukrainian National Self-Defense or UNSO) 
resisted pro-Soviet forces in Kyiv, protecting the meetings of the Ukrainian independence 
movement. 
 
some other similar groups merged to become the  (Ukrainian 
National Assembly or UNA).12 Later this transitioned into the UNA-UNSO with two wings: a political 
party (UNA) and a semi- 13 The UNSO was, apart 
from resisting various Russian neo-imperial activities, also engaged in confronting separatist and 
ethnic minority organizations and activities in Ukraine throughout the 1990s. 
 
In 1991 the UNA-UNSO became, for instance, known for assaulting the parliamentary Deputy of the 
Ukrainian SSR Mykola Honcharov,14 dispersing the Romanian Congress in the city of Chernivtsi,15 
and attacking pro-Russian rallies in Odesa.16 Later in the 1990s, the UNSO participated in foreign 
armed confrontations first in the Transnistria separation war,17 then in the Abkhazian conflict, and 
 
8 - Studii politolohichnoho tsentru Heneza 1 (1997): 48-51. 
9 
postmodernistskoho dyskursu (na prykladi UNA-
 3 (2013): 16-20. 
10  zakhysnykiv Vil niusa 1991 roku. Novynarnia, 11 
January 2020. https://novynarnia.com/2020/01/11/prezident-litvi-nagorodiv-grupu-ukrayintsiv-
zahisnikiv-vilnyusa-1991-roku-foto/.  
11 - UNA-UNSO, 17 April 2020. http://una-unso.com/styslyi-kurs-una-unso. 
12 -U  
13 -  
14 -  
15 -ye ukrainskiye natsionalisty sozdali partiyu, tserkov' i shtur
Lenta.ru, 20 October 2018, https://lenta.ru/articles/2018/10/22/ukrideology7/. 
16  
17 NATO Science for 
Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics (2016): 108-124.  
9 
 
later in the First Chechen war (more on this below).18 Some UNSO para-military units also took part 
in the Bosnian conflict on the side of local Croatians.19  
was to protect the Ukrainian community in left-bank Moldova.20 In doing so two UNSO paramilitary 
units ended up fighting alongside pro-Russian separatists against the Moldovan army. Thus, 
whether intentionally or not, Ukrainian ultra-nationalists functioned as situational allies to 
Moscow-related forces in Transnistria and even indirectly collaborated with the 14th USSR army 
21 This episode was one of the earliest 
instances of indirect Ukrainian ultra-nationalist cooperation with a Russian neo-imperialist action.  
 
The UNA-
during the Abkhazia armed conflict in Georgia. There, in the same period, the UNA-UNSO supported 
Tbilisi fighting on the Georgian side against pro-Russian Abkhaz separatists. For instance, on 15th 
Russian troops 
near the village Starushkino. This may have been the first armed clash on a battlefield between 
Ukrainian paramilitary and Russian regular forces during the post-Soviet period. Strangely, it 
happened about the same time that other activists of the UNSO were in Transnistria officially 
supporting the Ukrainian ethnic community against the Moldovan government and thereby 
indirectly collaborating with pro-Russian separatists in Moldova.22 
 
The UNSO also participated in the First Chechen War of 1994-1996 on the side of the anti-Moscow 
separatists, sending a so- 23 The first 
Parliament Yuriy Tym.24 It is worth noting here that the future leader of the UNA-UNSO, founder of 




Ukrainian political nation are identified by their affiliation with a particular state and not ethnicity. 
Yet in practice and rhetoric, the UNA-UNSO followed ethno-centric traditions of the radical Stepan 
Bandera wing of the war-time Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its paramilitary 
arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (  - UPA), known as OUN-UPA.26 
The UNA- -Bohdan Shukhevych (b. 1933), the son of Roman Shukhevych 
 
18 Pravyi radikalizm 
v Vostochnoi Evrope (Moscow: RAN, 2018): 134-167. 
19 -
rth, 1996. 
20 UNSO   (Kyiv-Mena: 
Dominant / Orienty, 2016). 
21  
22 and Transnistrian Print Media during the 1992 
Canadian Slavonic Papers 60:3-4 (2018): 497 528. 
23 -  
24 -  





(1907-1950) the one-time legendary leader of the UPA who died fighting the Soviet regime.27 The 
leaders of the UNSO claimed they followed the military traditions of the UPA, and some UNSO 
participants eventually became members of radical parties with more explicitly ethno-nationalist 
ideologies. 
 
The All-  
 
The party that later became Svoboda 
Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). It was largely based in Eastern Galicia and founded by 
representatives of the local branches of the Afghanistan Veterans Organization, the nationalist 
 (Heritage) chaired by Andriy Parubiy (b. 1971) who would later 
-2019, 
Oleh Tiahnybok (b. 1968), and the paramili  
first leader.28 In 2004, the SNPU was renamed All- Svoboda
elected Tiahnybok as its new chairman. The party usually performed poorly in national 
parliamentary elections (Table 1). However, in October 2012 it passed into the Verkhovna Rada 
(Supreme Council) with 10.44% of the votes in the proportional part of the voting, on which more 
below.29 This remains today the, by far, best national electoral result of a far-right organization in 
post-Soviet Ukrainian history.30 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s the party when it was still called SNPU was mainly engaged 
in non-electoral activities in Western Ukraine.31 For example, its members would picket the 
Verkhovna Rada building in Kyiv, protesting language and culture issues. They also provided 
security services for the Kyiv Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, among others.32 Like 
other Ukrainian far-right parti
-founded as Svoboda and 
 
27 
Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 5:1 (2016): 26 -
CHESNO PolitHub, 1 January 2020, https://www.chesno.org/politician/17209/. 
28 - Svoboda, 1 April 2020, https://svoboda.org.ua/party/history/.  
29 -Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-
Right Wing Populism in 
Europe: Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013): 249- -
Russian Politics and Law 51:5 (2013): 59-74. 
30 Forum 
9:1 (2013): 22- rotiv 
- Forum noveishei 
9:1 (2013): 64-
Party Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Puzzle of the Electoral Marginalism of Ukrainian 
Ultranationalists in 1994- Russian Politics and Law 51:5 (2013): 33- -
Russian 
Politics and Law 51:5 (2013): 75-85. 
31 The Ideology and Development of the Social-National Party of Ukraine, and its 
Transformation into the All- Communist and Post-Communist 




rebranded its public image in the mid-2000s.33
leadership and organization (more on this later). 
 
Svoboda started to rise to national prominence soon after pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych 
(b. 1950) won the presidential elections in 2010.34 In this context, Svoboda became the most visible 
Ukrainian ultra-
of Regions and in support of Ukrainian language and culture.35 In 2012, Svoboda was one of the 
main organizers of protests against the pro-Russian Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law: a new language bill 
associated with pro-Russian politicians Serhiy Kivalov (b. 1954) and Vadym Kolesnichenko (b. 
1958) that allowed until 2018 the Russian language to be used as a second state-language in 
certain regions.36 As a new member of parliament, Tiahnybok became one of the leaders of 
Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014. And Svoboda had a few ministers in the first post-Euromaidan 
government in late February 2014.37 Yet the party had already squandered much of its reputation 
and popularity by then.38 As a result of the autumn 2014 parliamentary elections, Svoboda lost its 
representatives in the Ukrainian government and faction in the Verkhovna Rada, becoming again a 
largely extra-parliamentary opposition party with a notable political presence only in Eastern 
Galician regional and local parliaments.39 
 
The Azov Movement and National Corps 
 
After the Euromaidan revolution, the Azov movement which grew out of a volunteer battalion 
that was first stationed at the Sea of Azov in 2014 emerged as a new attention-grabbing, multi-
-revolutionary landscape. Since summer 2014, 
the Azov movement has become a prominent new right-wing force in Ukraine, even rivalling the 
Svoboda party.40 The various organizations, departments, fronts, branches, and arms of the Azov 
movement have been estimated to be able to mobilize 20,000 members all over Ukraine.41  
 
 
33 Viacheslav Likhachev, Right-Wing Extremism in Ukrai Kyiv: EAJC, 2013).  
34 
Europe-Asia Studies 63:2 (2011): 203-228. 
35 Michael Moser, Language Policy and Discourse on Languages in Ukraine Under President Viktor Yanukovych 
(25 February 2010 28 October 2012) (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2013). 




Forum noveishei 13:1 (2016): 103-127. 
38 
Eurozine, 5 March 2014. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-03-05-shekhovtsov-en.html/. 
39 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48:2 (2015): 239-256. 
40 -Euromaidan Ukraine: The Prehistory 
Terrorism and Political Violence 31:1 (2019): 105-131; Ivan 
Institutionalization of the Azov Movement in Post- Nationalities Papers 47:5 (2019): 
774-800. 





The Azov movement has its roots in a little known and initially Russian-speaking Kharkiv 
42 This initially miniscule circle emerged from the 
paramilitary wing of the same name that had been disbanded in 2004.43 The young leader of the 
imprisoned in 2011-2012 for various reasons, including alleged robbery, beatings, terrorism, and 
assaults. Partly, these accusations were overdrawn and referred to political rather than criminal 
episodes. The locked-up ultra-nationalists were released after the toppling of Viktor Yanukovych in 
early 2014.44 
 
regular army forces who wore no identification marks while occupying Crimea in late February and 
early March 2014.45 As the confrontation with pro-
46 In May 2014, it formed the semi-
47 In summer 2014, 
the Azov battalion played a central role in the liberation of the important Donbas industrial city of 
Mariupol from Russia-led separatists.48  
 
By autumn 2014, the battalion had become a well-known professional military unit and was 
Interior of Ukraine.49 It has since been considered one of Ukraine's most capable armed formations. 
mmanders claim it is now operating according to NATO standards.50 In winter 
2015, veterans and volunteers of the regiment created the Azov Civil Corps and thereby started to 
 
42 -
Patterns of Prejudice 37:1 (2003): 27-50. 
43 
Osteuropa 69:3-4 (2019): 149 162. 
44 Ndrugua.org, 23 
June 2019, https://ndrugua.org/articles/velyke-intervyu-komandyr-nacionalny/  
45 "Ne bachu zhodnoho parostka do stvorennia armii novoho zrazka", Gazeta.ua, 10 June 2015, 
https://gazeta.ua/articles/people-and-things-journal/_ne-bachu-zhodnogo-parostka-do-stvorennia-armiyi--
novogo-zrazka/625937 BBC, 2014, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154. 




UNIAN, 11 October 2014, https://www.unian.ua/politics/994779-komandir-polku-azov-andriy-
biletskiy-ti-hto-prolivae-krov-za-ukrajinu-povinni-mati-sviy-golos-u-vladi.html. 
48 krov za Ukrayinu, povynni maty svii holos u 
UNIAN, 11 October 2014, https://www.unian.ua/politics/994779-komandir-polku-azov-andriy-
biletskiy-ti-hto-prolivae-krov-za-ukrajinu-povinni-mati-sviy-golos-u-vladi.html. 
49 18 September 
2014, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/09/18/7038164/. 





expand their political grouping into a multi-faceted social movement.51
the political party National Corps, drawing membership from the Azov Civil Corps and veterans of 
the Azov Battalion and Regiment.52 
In January 2018, an offshoot of the Azov movement, the unarmed vigilante organization National 
Squads ( ), became a Ukrainian media sensation after it held a visually 
impressive public torch march.53 Further sub-organizations and branches of the Azov movement 
have emerged since 2014.54 They include entities such as the Engineering Corps, Cossack House 
(Kozats kyy dim), Plomin (Flame) Literary Club, Orden (Order) circle, Youth Corps, Intermarium 
Support Group, and others.55 While being partly independent, the fronts and subunits of the Azov 
movement share basic stances on certain political issues, closely cooperate with each other, and 
ow a multi-
dimensional socio-political movement that is developing in a variety of directions. 
Though initially at a distance from other Ukrainian far right groups, Azov, since 2016, has started to 
cooperate with other ultra-nationalists in Ukraine. In spring 2019, the National Corps joined an 
electoral alliance of several Ukrainian far-right parties under the organizational umbrella of 
Svoboda 
however, received only 2.15% in the proportional part of the elections and thus fell short of the 5% 
entrance barrier to parliament. The ultra-nationalist coalition also failed to win any seats in the 
majoritarian part of the election and so was unable to secure any official mandates in Ukraine 9 th 
Verkhovna Rada. While the current Ukrainian parliament contains several members who have 
-
the Ukrainian far right, namely to Svoboda.56 
Despite officially allying itself with Svoboda and others since 2016, the Azov movement remains an 
-nationalist political 
spectrum and contains branches that profess views untypical to the traditional Ukrainian far right.57 
For example, some Azov members espouse not a Christian-Orthodox outlook, but an interest in 
paganism.58 The Azov movement has conducted numerous semi-political street actions in major 
cities and smaller towns around Ukraine, such as rallies against the closure of a university in Zhovti 
51  
52 
Interfax.com.ua, 14 October 2016, https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/political/376701.html. 
53 Radio 
Svoboda, 30 Januray 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29008242.html. 
54 Nackor.org, 8 December 2015, https://nackor.org/ukr/azovskoe-dvizhenie.  
55  
56 - and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party 
Politics to Ethno- Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 28:2 
(2020): 247-268. 
57 Illiberalism Studies Program 
Working Papers 1 (2020), https://www.illiberalism.org/olena-semeniaka-the-first-lady-of-ukrainian-
nationalism/. 





Vody 59 Another major mobilizing issue are 
various ecological problems across Ukraine.60  
 
-2021 Minister for Internal 
Affairs, Arsen Avakov (b. 1964). And there is evidence of connections between the Azov-dominated 
61 Nevertheless, since 2014 the 
been that of a resolute opposition force engaged in clashes with the 
police and political mobilization against the government.62 
 
The Azov Battalion/Regiment has been particularly active in recruiting foreigners to fight in 
eastern Ukraine.63 Among all the foreign fighters present in the Donbas, there may have been as 
many as 3,000 Russian citizens who fought in the Russian-Ukrainian war on the side of the 
Ukrainian state.64 Some of them served and are still serving with the Azov Regiment. As detailed 
below, a number of these former or current Russian citizens are also actively involved in the 
65 
 
In August 2020, a number of Azov leaders and veterans as well as other activists from certain 
nationalist student and cadet groups presented a new paramilitary right-wing organization labeled 
Centuria a Roman Empire term for a military unit of hundred men.66 The Ukrainian group uses the 
Latin version and transcription of the more familiar Ukrainian word sotnia (hundred) as its official 
name.67 Against a backdrop of images of Roman legions, Centuria held its first public presentation 
wi
speaker. This move signaled that the National Squads had been replaced by Centuria.68 
 
 
59 nyy Korpus prodovzhuye borot bu za mozhlyvist  studentiv Zhovtykh Vod navchatysia u 
Nationalcorps.org, 20 June 2017, https://nationalcorps.org/naconalnij-korpus-prodovzhu-
borotbu-za-mozhlivst-studentv-zhovtih-vod-navchatisja-u-rdnomu-mst/. 
60 Natsional nyy 
Korpus, 22 April 2018, https://youtu.be/BVH4axKZlJU.  
61  With Co Bellingcat, 
11 November 2019, www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/11/11/ukraines-ministry-of-veterans-
affairs-embraced-the-far-right-with-consequences-to-the-u-s/.  
62  hlavoiu MVS  Prm.ua, 19 July 2019, 
https://prm.ua/avakov-hoche-zalishitis-glavoyu-mvs-cherenenko-pro-napad-na-poroshenka/.  
63 -Nazi Group That Calls Ukraine 
Bellingcat, 4 September 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/09/04/the-
hardcore-russian-neo-nazi-group-that-calls-ukraine-home/. 
64 Counter 
Extremism Project, April 2020, p. 7, https://www.counterextremism.com/press/new-cep-report-career-
break-or-new-career-extremist-foreign-fighters-ukraine. 
65 Colborne and Kuzmenk -  
66 
had contacts with the Azov movement, yet are not closely linked to it. 
67 




s website announced that their org
69 Since 2020 Centuria has been 
involved in a variety of public activities such as participating in the annual march on October 14 in 
Kyiv honoring the UPA,70 rallies against illegal logging,71 court hearings on right-wing activists, and 
72 Thereby, the organization duplicates the activism of 
its predecessor, the National Squads. While not formally subordinated to the National Corps, most 
of Centuria t.73 
Centuria 
74 While the former National Squads posed as an unofficial law enforcement 
militia, Centuria has a more open range of interests and is primarily engaged in anti-Russian 
activities throughout Ukraine.75 Centuria activists attacked 
Mykhailo Shpira, a pro-Russian political observer,76 and in October 2020 blocked a rally in 
Vinnytsia for the pro-Russian Shariy Party.77  
One of the largest actions of the movement so far was supporting 16 convicts, mainly from Kharkiv, 
-Russian Ukrainian youth organization 
 78 (More on Kyva, below.) Since then, actions in support of the convicted 
Kharkiv nationalists have made up the majority of Centuria's actions.79 There have also been further 
attacks on pro-Russian actors, one of which led to mass clashes on September 21, 2020, in Odesa.80 
Centuria uses military paraphernalia and prepares its members for military service. It trains its own 
territorial defense groups, in effect duplicating the operation of similar units within the reserves of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine.81 The number of members of the organization is currently unknown 
69 Centuria.ua, https://centuria-ua.com/. 
70 Centuria, 15 October 2020, https://youtu.be/HShvUliDe2w. 
71 Centuria.ua, 11 December 2020, https://centuria-ua.com/nezakonna-vyrubka-
lisu/. 
72 kyi zamok. Chastyna- Centuria, 28 October 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgsPztsoex4&ab_channel=Centuria.  
73  
74 Centuria.ua, https://centuria-ua.com/.  
75  
76 UNIAN, 26 June 2020, 
https://www.unian.ua/incidents/mihaylo-shpir-u-lvovi-pobili-polittehnologa-prorosiyskih-zmi-shcho-
vidomo-foto-novini-lvova-11124815.html. 
77 Centuria, 10 October 2020, 
https://t.me/Centuriaua/197. 
78 kym robinhudam: 9 veresnya v Kyevi vidbudet sia pres-konferentsia-nahorodzhennia 
Natsional`nyy Korpus, 7 September 2020, https://nationalcorps.org/svobodu-harkivskim-
robingudam-9-veresnya-v-kievi-vidbudetsya-pres-konferenciya-nagorodzhennya-patriotiv/.  
79 Centuria, 31 July 2020, https://centuria-ua.com/v-sudi-pravdy-ne-shukayut/. 
80  sutychky mizh orhanizatsiamy Bilets
Radio Svoboda, 3 September 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30818339.html. 
81 
Youtube, 10 December 2020, https://youtu.be/JYtR_kMW9-o. 
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Squads, which had approximately 1,000 active members.82 
 
The Right Sector 
 
The Pravyy sektor (Right Sector, PS) was originally formed in late 2013 during the early 
Euromaidan protests as an informal umbrella organization of several minor political and 
paramilitary far-right groups. For about half a year, until approximately mid-2014, it looked as if PS 
was becoming a serious competitor of the older Svoboda party.83 The Right Sector became famous 
during the events of January-
Yarosh (b. 1971), took public responsibility for cla
Street in central Kyiv. The confrontation there was a key escalation in the development of the 
protests.84 However, beyond a high public visibility, not the least via Russian and pro-Russian 
media, the degree of substantive impact of the far right on the emergence, progress, escalation, and 
conclusion of the protests are contested issues among researchers of these events.85  
 
With the onset of the war in eastern Ukraine, the Right Sector formed the Volunteer Ukrainian 
Corps (   DUK), a small irregular military unit for which the term 
ly to have nearly 20,000 active 
participants, a seemingly vast exaggeration.86 In reality, the overall number of permanently 
involved members of the decentralized movement was about several hundred men and some 
groupings which were emerging across Ukraine, though some had little to do with the original Right 
Sector, with its headquarters in Kyiv.  
 
Early on the Right Sector became publicly discredited by a number of local events such as an armed 
clash in Mukachevo in 2015 when several members of its local branch were involved in a shoot-out 
with a local criminal group.87 Earlier, in March 2014, the former leader of the Rivne Right Sector 
branch in western Ukraine and convicted criminal Oleksandr Muzychko (1962-2014), also known 
 
82   
83 BBC Ukraine, 14 January 2014. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/01/140120_ru_s_right_sector.shtml. 
84 Deutsche Welle, 20 November 2019. 
85 Kritika: Explorations in Russian 
and Eurasian History 16:1 (2015): 137
-Mihai, ed., N.E.C. Black Sea Link Program Yearbook 2014-2015 (Bucharest: 
New Europe College, 2015): 216-
The Ideology and Politics Journal 1:5 (2015): 4- hastie kraine pravykh 
Zaborona, 3 May 2018, 
https://zaborona.com/likhachov-column/
, 9 July 2018, commons.com.ua/ru/far-right-civil-society/; Ivan 
Journal of Labor and 
Society 23:1 (2020), 5-36. 
86 ky batal BBC Ukraine, 15 July 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/07/150714_right_sector_now_vc.  




been among the paramilitary UNSO volunteers in Chechnya and wanted in Russia since. 
 
In 2015 the original organization split when its popular leader Dmytro Yarosh (b. 1971) resigned as 
the head of the Right Sector. He founded his own micro-
prominent leaders. Whereas it was highly prominent in Ukrainian, Russian, and Western mass 
media in 2014, the Right Sector today is not even mentioned in many opinion polls and, when it is 
listed, generates minimal support from respondents. Nevertheless, the Right Sector has remained a 
registered party and has operated, for the last years, in close cooperation with Svoboda, the 




Many of the widely known Ukrainian radical right activists are members of one of the relevant 
right-wing political parties. There are also a number of activists, however, whose activities are 
focused on direct action in the societal and cultural realm rather than on electoral participation. 
The main organizations active within Ukrainian civil society in addition to the above-mentioned 




After leaving the UNA-UNSO in 1997, one of its most well-
became mainly a publicist and commentator.89 In 1999, he founded a new organization called 
Bratstvo (Brotherhood).90 Bratstvo has sought its own 
niche as a demonstratively radical party. Yet, it is still mostly perceived as a lunatic-fringe group.91  
 
Bratstvo was one of the few far-right movements which did not support the Orange Revolution of 
2004. Instead, for a time, it cooperated with pro-Russian and pro-Putin structures  on which more 
below.92 However, during the 2013-
early on. In particular, Bratstvo was involved in a dubious violent demonstration and confrontation 
with the police in front of the Presidential Administration building on December 1, 2013.93 At the 
beginning of the Russian-
Battalion before he created his own armed paramilitary unit, the Saint Mary Battalion.94 
 
88 kykh natsionalistiv ob
Hromadske, 16 March 2017, https://hromadske.ua/posts/lidery-natsionalistychnykh-partii-pidpysaly-
manifest-pro-spilnu-diialnist.  
89 Liga.net, 21 Januray 2020, https://file.liga.net/persons/korchinskiy-dmitriy.  
90  
91 kyy-  19 July 2004, 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2004/07/19/3001239/. 
92 Glavred.info, 8 April 2011, 
https://glavred.info/politics/3817-dmitriy-korchinskiy-ya-hochu-v-ukraine-hristianskuyu-hizballu.html; 
kym stvoriuiut  narodnu opozytsiiu i klychut  
22 February 2005, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/02/22/3007322/. 





The neo- 95 It consists of a 
few hundred members, mainly young men and women.96 
code for an infamous quote from the US white supremacist David Eden Lane who coined the 14-
been entirely marginal until 2013, C14 gained publicity via its involvement in the Revolution of 
Dignity.97 It also became infamous for its actions against anarchist, leftist, liberal, and pro-Russian 
groups. It was also notorious for attacking LGBTQ+ groups and their supporters during the Kyiv 
Pride parades between 2015 2018.98 
The Carpathian Sich 
The Uzhhorod-based far-right group called the Transcarpathian Military-Patriotic Union 
 -registered informal group in 2010 
under the leadership of Taras Deiak (b. 1992).99 It is lesser known than the other groups discussed 
in this paper. The Sich cooperated with or was temporarily part of the Right Sector  and maintained 
contacts with Svoboda as well as the international department of the Azov movement.100 Almost all 
the activities and members of the organization are concentrated in the Transcarpathian Oblast of 
Ukraine.  
March.101 They also reject the Istanbul Convention on Human Rights.102 In addition, they have 
developed links to several European, far-right micro-organizations and publicly support white 
supremacist terrorist acts. In August 2019, the Carpathian Sich posted on social media a Ukrainian 
translation of the manifesto written by Australian terrorist Brenton Tarrant, the mass murderer of 
Muslims at Christchurch in New Zealand.103 
95 - Bellingcat, 9 August 2019, 
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/08/09/yes-its-still-ok-to-call-ukraines-c14-neo-
nazi/.  
96 -radykaly chy neonatsyst Radio Svoboda, 19 March 2018, 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29109819.html.  
97 Serhiy Movch Politychna krytyka, 19 July 2017, 
http://ukraine.politicalcritique.org/2017/07/19/nestandart-bbc-abo-sorom-yazlivi-teroristi/. 
98 trapravi hotuiut  anty-LHBT aktsii do praydu- , 16 June 2019, 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/06/16/7218311/. 
99 Karpats`ka Sich, 20 April 2020, https://karpatskasich.com/. 
100 FOIA Research, 14 January 2019, 
https://www.foiaresearch.net/organization/karpatska-sich FOIA Research, 3 
March 2019, https://www.foiaresearch.net/article/2nd-paneuropa-conference. 
101 - Karpats ka Sich, 2 June 2019, https://karpatskasich.com/news/item/74-
kyiivprayd-pidsumky.  
102 Zmina, 9 March 2017, 
https://zmina.info/news/v_uzhgorodi_nacionalisti_napali_na_miting_za_prava_zhinok_ta_proti_nasilstva-2/. 







According to its leaders, the Kyiv-based, ultra-conservative groupuscule  
104 In Kyiv, it has become an active post-
Maidan right-wing organization and is often visible during rallies against the Ukrainian LGBTQ+ 
community.105 106  
 
Many of its members supposedly fought in the Donbas as participants of volunteer battalions 
against the Russia-led separatists. Some activists of the group claim to have ties to the newly united 
autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine established in 2019.107 
a 
fascist Romanian party from the inter-war period.108 
 
TiP has been involved in far-right attacks on the yearly Kyiv Pride demonstrations, trying to disrupt 
the marches.109 Perceiving themselves as Christian fundamentalists, the members of TiP consider 
foreign influence on Ukraine as harmful and are especially opposed to left-liberal values.110 TiP 
identifies the movement of 1968 as its key opponent and sees its own formation as a reaction to the 
emergence of neo-Marxist discourses in Ukraine.111 
 
104 Interview of Taras Tarasiuk with members of TiP. 
105  
23 June 2019, https://ukranews.com/ua/news/638287-aktsiya-protestu-tradytsiyi-i-
poryadku-prohodyt-na-shlyahu-hody-kolony-v-pidtrymku-lgbt-v-kyievi.  
106 Kontrakty.ua, 17 April 
2019, http://m.kontrakty.ua/photo/7976/4. 
107 Interview of Taras Tarasiuk with members of TiP. 
108 Interview of Taras Tarasiuk with members of TiP. 
109  aktsiia protestu na shliakhu khody Kyiv  
110 Interview of Taras Tarasiuk with members of TiP. 
111 Interview of Taras Tarasiuk with members of TiP. 
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Interactions of Ukraine's Ultra-Nationalists with Russian Actors
Post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist discourses are often loudly and radically anti-Russian. Yet, both 
Ukrainian and Russian ultra-nationalism developed after the fall of the Iron Curtain and within the 
context of wider, interconnected East European, all-European, or global far-right trends. Thus, there 
are similarities in the ideas, concepts, and tactics of these transnational ideological movements and 
cross-border organizational networks whether fundamentalist, ultra-conservative, neo-Nazi, 
Identitarian, pan-nationalist or other. As a result, there was and is not only certain mutual interest 
among the respective Russian and Ukrainian groups. Occasionally this has also led to contacts and 
even collaboration between sections of both ultra-nationalist movements. 
The historically and currently predominant tendency between Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms 
is, to be sure, opposition. The already high estrangement between the Ukrainian and Russian far 
right surged further in the 2000s when most of the Ukrainian right-wing forces supported pro-
112 For the Russian far right, 
Ukrainian ultra- -Western course as well as his diaspora-
linked, U.S.-born second wife, Kateryna Yushchenko (b. 1961, née Chumachenko), became 
additional sources of irritation. This polarization escalated during the presidency of Viktor 
Yanukovych (b. 1950) in 2010- -European vector of 
-Russian position became a for all 
Ukrainian patriots, whether radical or not.113 
-Russian foreign and cultural policies led to a temporary broadening of Ukrainian 
support for outspoken nationalism. During this period from 2010, certain Russian ultra-nationalists 
began to flee Russia for countries like Ukraine. This migration accelerated during and after the 
Euromaidan revolution of 2013-2014. Somewhat overstating the magnitude of the phenomenon, 
Michael Colborne and Oleksiy Kuzmenko of Bellingcat noted: 
Many Russian far-right nationalists have, perhaps to the surprise of many, been anti-
like immig
the Russian far-right was instrumental in fomenting and fighting in the ongoing war 
in eastern Ukraine, some factions of the Russian far-right actually supported the 
protests on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv that mushroomed into the February 2014 
revolution and have found room to operate within Ukraine.114 
This phenomenon was not, however, entirely new in Russian-Ukrainian relations. 
112 -right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak 




113 Moser, Language Policy and Discourse on Languages in Ukraine Under President Viktor Yanukovych.  
114  Russian Neo-Nazi Group That Calls Ukraine Home.   
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Ukrainian Far Right Contacts with Russian Ultra-Nationalists
In the early 1990s, the first indirectly pro-Russian activity of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists was their 
participation in the separatist war in Moldova on the side of local Ukrainians (as mentioned above). 
As indicated, the UNA-
military in Transnistria.115 However, this incident of armed collaboration has remained an 
exception. Because the primary interest of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists in Transnistria was the 
Ukrainian population it cannot count as an expression of support by the UNA-UNSO for Russian 
imperialism. 
In the mid-1990s, one of the friendliest encounters in Ukraine between Ukrainian and anti-Kremlin 
Russian ultra-nationalists occurred between the UNA-
Party of Russia (   NNPR). According to Albert Shatrov, 
[i]n 1996 in Kyiv, at a [joint] conference of the UNA-
Party of Russia (NNPR), [its leader] Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky (b. 1950)
discussed the idea of creating a coordinating common conspiratorial White Order.
The NNPR then planned to take part in the agitation of federal troops in Chechnya
on the subject of fraternization with Chechens and turning weapons against the
Kremlin.116
This amounted to an attempted collaboration of non-imperial ultra-nationalists to counter Russian 
 
Under President Putin, such contacts became more frequent. Natalia Yudina has summarized some 
of them: 
Ukraine has [been] a refuge for Russian right-wing radicals since the early 2000s. 
Pyotr Khomyakov, the ideological mastermind of the Northern Brotherhood 
(Severnoe bratstvo), spent some time hiding there; so did Yuri Belyaev, the leader of 
the neo-Nazi Freedom Party (Partiia svobody). Also hiding in Ukraine were 
Alexander Parinov and Alexei Korshunov, former members of the neo-Nazi groups 
United Brigades-88 ( -88, OB-88), and the Combat Organization 
of Russian Nationalists (Boevaia organizatsiia russkikh natsionalistov, BORN). 
Korshunov was killed by his own grenade in Zaporozhye in October 2011. BORN co-
founder Nikita Tikhonov, later convicted for the murders of lawyer Stanislav 
Markelov and journalist Anastasia Baburova, was also hiding in Ukraine for some 
in the creation of the Ukrainian cell of the international neo-Nazi association called 
The Misanthropic Division. The Misanthropic Division is not a centralized 
organization: it does not have permanent leaders or a rigid structure. There are 
branches in Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal, the United States, and, it 
seems, even in Belarus. The Ukrainian branch was organized in 2013 under the 
115 -
Segodnya.ua, 19 June 2012, https://www.segodnya.ua/world/20-let-konfliktu-v-pridnectrove-una-unco-
pohibali-ukraintsy-i-my-dolzhny-byli-ikh-zashchishchat-308277.html. 
116 -




A new wave of cooperation between parts of the two ultra-nationalist camps started during and 
after the Euromaidan of 2013-2014 when Russian ultra-nationalists with pro-Ukrainian views 
participated in the uprising in Kyiv and beginning war in the Donbas.118 The biggest accumulation of 
active Russian, and presumably anti-Putinist, right-wing radicals in Ukraine were within the Azov 
movement, including in its battalion/regiment. Yudina explained that the  
demonstrations, in clashes with Maidan opponents in Kharkov, and some of them 
its Russian 
Korotkikh, one of the leaders of the National Socialist Society (Natsional-
sotsialisticheskoe obshchestvo, NSO); Alexander Valov from Murmansk; Roman 
ov of the Restrukt! Association; and neo-Nazi leader Mikhail 
Oreshnikov from Cheboksary. [...] After the end of the active phase of the hostilities 
in Ukraine, almost all of them stayed in Ukraine. Some of them integrated into 
Ukrainian society, received Ukrainian citizenship, and now take part in local 
political life.119  
Moreover, some Russian neo-Nazi groupuscules are represented, with their Ukrainian branches, in 
120 Michael Colborne and Oleksiy Kuzmenko discussed one 
such group:  
Wotanjugend 
content almost exclusively in Russian. Today the self-
-right Azov movement that is trying to expand its domestic and 
international influence. But Wotanjugend
In 2018 the head of Wotanjugend met with members of violent American neo-Nazi 
gang Rise Above Movement (RAM) in Kyiv. Wotanjugend also recently hosted a 
seminar that included lectures on race, firearms training and even a mock knife fight 
tournament. Moreover, the head of the group, Alexei Levkin, is hopeful he will 
receive Ukrainian citizenship, and has been a key f
Ukrainian citizenship for far-right friends from abroad who have joined their ranks. 
With its message that includes terrorist fanboying and literally worship of Hitler, 
Wotanjugend continues to operate openly in Ukraine, using the country as a base to 
grow and to spread its message of hate worldwide.121  
117 
transcription of names here and elsewhere, as in the original source). 
118 Natalia Yud Journal on Baltic Security 1:1 (2015): 47 61. 
119  
120 o-Nazi Group That Calls Ukraine Home." See also: 
- Hate Speech International, 3 February 2015, www.hate-
speech.org/ukraines-far-right-forces/. 
121 -  
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Wotanjugend community and a 
former FSB officer, left for Ukraine in 2014 and fought in the Right Sector [i.e., seemingly, in the 
122 
become one of the main lobbyists for the legalization of the status (as permanent residents or 
citizens) of foreigners who fought against pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.123 Several such 
foreigners, including some Russian ultra-nationalist immigrants, received citizenship during the 
2014-2019 presidency of Petro Poroshenko (b. 1965). Sometimes such status was granted in 
explicit gratitude of their contribution to the Ukrainian defense effort in the Donbas.  
The most infamous case involved a former member of the neo-Nazi Russian National Unity party 
and Belarusian People's Front Sergei Korotkikh (b. 1974) who, after his move to Ukraine in 2014, 
became a key figure in the Azov movement.124 Yudina detailed the case: 
Korotkikh received his Ukrainian passport from president Petro Poroshenko 
personally on December 5, 2014. He worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Ukraine, heading the Special Objects Protection Unit, but he left this post in late 
2017. Along with his fellow Azov member Nikita Makeev, Korotkikh was suspected 
of involvement in the attack against Petro Poroshenko in August 2019. However, 
Korotkikh never faced responsibility for this case. In the spring of 2020, he 
continued to act as a representative of the National Corps (Natsional nyy korpus), 
125 
Another such figure was Aleksei Levkin, a former member of the Russian group Wotanjungend, who 
immigrated from Russia and also gained some importance in the Azov movement. He called himself 
  (National Squads). 
The Ukrainian political careers of Korotkikh, Levkin, and others indicate considerable influence of 
Russian former neo-Nazis within the Azov movement.126  
The ideological basis for such seemingly paradoxical contacts and even partial merger is a 
particular type of racist pan-Slavism. In this context the issues of national sovereignty and territory 
are secondary to an allegedly common pan-national or even pan-
identity. Some branches of Russian ultra-nationalism, like the Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration, support the concept of a community of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians. Unlike 
most other permutations of Russian ultra-nationalism, these subsections do not always assert, 
-à-
Eastern Slavic family of peoples. They are instead obsessed with preventing large-scale non-
Christian, specifically Muslim, immigration that would create a racial-cultural subversion by non-
white people in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. They are also concerned with the rise of LGBTQ+ 
movements in these countries.  
122  
123  
Bellingcat, 11 November 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/11/11/ukraines-
ministry-of-veterans-affairs-embraced-the-far-right-with-consequences-to-the-u-s/. 
124  Belorusskii partizan, 
16 January 2015, https://belaruspartisan.by/life/292580/.  
125  
126 Colborne and Kuzmenko, "The 'Hardcore' Russian Neo-Nazi Group That Calls Ukraine Home."  
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At the same time, as illustrated by the heavy involvement of  (Russian 
National Unity, RNE) in the start of the Donbas war, the majority of Russian neo-Nazism, it needs to 
be emphasized, is as anti-Ukrainian as most other varieties of Russian ultra-nationalism, from neo-
Eurasianism to Orthodox fundamentalism.127 Within the latter one can also occasionally find 
isolated individuals or minor subsections that 
integrity. However, most pro-Ukrainian thinking within Russian ultra-nationalism is found in 
various Russian groupuscules espousing biological racism. Often these groups whether in Russia, 
in Ukraine, or elsewhere -national 
community. They thus espouse sympathy towards all those who they regard as being within this 
 
Among the small pro-Ukrainian section of Russian political extremism, whether biologically racist 
groupuscules, like the Wotanjugend, have moved to Ukraine. Other such activists have more or less 
successfully also tried to take part in the Russian-Ukrainian war, supporting the Ukrainian side. 
The Russian Insurgent Army and Russian Center 
An expression of this type of Russian-Ukrainian far-right interaction came together to form the 
quasi-party Russian Center and its paramilitary arm, the Russian Insurgent Army. The latter is the 
hyperbolic name for a miniscule group apparently made up of several dozen young adults. So far 
rtual.  
), a relatively well-known 
Russian opposition blogger who had emigrated from Russia to Ukraine.128 Together with some 
other immigrants from Russia, he formed what was suggestively called the Russkaia 
Povstancheskaia Armiia (Russian Insurgent Army). The title alludes to the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army, a western Ukrainian nationalist, partisan movement during and after World War II that 
fought Soviet and Nazi troops but was tainted by some of its units committing mass murder of 
Polish and Jewish civilians in western Ukraine.129 The name, Russian Insurgent Army, may also refer 
to the Russian Liberation Army, the unfamous Vlasov Russian unit that fought alongside the 
Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union during World War II.130  
The Russian Insurgent Army claims to have participated on the Ukrainian side against pro-Russian 
forces in the Donbas war.131 It has also been rumored to have conducted clandestine activity within 
127 - Osteuropa 69:3-4 
(2019): 103 121. 
128 10 April 
2015, https://www.obozrevatel.com/politics/65823-v-batalone-oun-voyuyut-rossiyane-kotoryih-na-rodine-
obvinyayut-v-separatizme.htm.  
129 Most recently on some aspects of this problematic history: John-Paul Himka, Ukrainian Nationalists and the 
1944 (Stuttgart: ibidem-
Verlag, 2021). 
130 Russkaia Povstancheskaia Armiia, 20 April 2020, http://dobrovoletz.blogspot.com/.  
131 Andrei Kuznetsov, Viktor 
ALIVEMEDIA, 30 December 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_66RhYXK7X0. 
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Russia, a supposition that seems implausible.132 The Russian Insurgent Army was first presented to 
the public on December 29, 2014 at a press conference in Kyiv. The young anti-Kremlin activist 
Andrei Kuznetsov made an appeal for the unification of anti-Putinist Russian forces. He addressed 
ants of white immigrants [...] who do not want Russian culture 
133  
The movement rejects Eurasianism and officially espouses an ethno-centric, yet supposedly 
-wing ideology. It mostly uses concepts and symbols representing radical rather 
than liberal nationalist discourses. While the group may be made up of a variety of individuals of 
different persuasions, it is seemingly dominated by racist activists, as various entries on its website 
illustrate.134  
The formation of the Russian Insurgent Army led to creation of an ethnic Russian political 
organization in Ukraine called the Russian Center, linked to the Azov movement. Its existence was 
announced on October 11, 2015 in Kyiv.135 The Russian Center is another minor organization made 
up of Russian nationalist political immigrants in Ukraine. Natalia Yudina detailed that the Russian 
Center was  
created in September 2015 by members of Wotanjugend, an ultra-right online 
group, and by activists of the Kirov cell of the Movement against Illegal Immigration 
( , DPNI-Vyatka), now banned in Russia. The 
Russian Center positions itself specifically as pan-Slavist, calling for the unity of all 
Slavs, and seeking to reach beyond Russia and Ukraine. They cooperate with 
nationalists in other countries, primarily with Polish nationalists from Zadruga (a 
Polish neo-  Free 
Poland (a radical Polish group that became famous in 2015 after the destruction of a 
Ukrainian cultural center in Warsaw). In September 2018, they conducted an event 
-
Th
November 11, 2018. The Russian Center from Ukraine marched along with the Black 
and Glory to the Her
2019, some of its activists participated in the torchlight procession on the 101st 
Etnofutur third international 
nationalist conference in Tallinn. 
The Russian Center has contacts to several right-wing radical groups in Ukraine, such as the 
Carpathian Sich in Uzhhorod.136 Both the Russian Center and the Carpathian Sich were co-hosts, for 




134 Russkaia Povstancheskaia Armiia, 20 April 2020, http://dobrovoletz.blogspot.com/. 
135 UNIAN Fotobank, 11 May 2015, https://photo.unian.net/photo/664249-prezidium; 
A-Radio, 19 September 2019, 
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instance, of the 2019 Hungarian Festung Budapest (Fortress Budapest), an international meeting of 
far-right activists organized by Legio Hungaria that included representatives from Hammerskins 
Betyársereg. The 
long-
their allies who fought Soviet troops for Budapest at the end of World War II).137 The Russian 
 -14, 
2019 in Uzhhorod and in a joint march of the Radical Alliance.138 
 
s closest Ukrainian contact is, however, the Azov movement. Since 2016 
members of the Russian Center have taken part in several conferences organized by the 
promotion of international cooperation among European radically right-wing groups and carried 
139 Nevertheless, the Russian Insurgent Army and 
and society that even many Ukrainian political analysts may have never heard of them. 
 
refugees are in contact with his network of Russians in Ukraine. According to him, other Russian 
immigrants are in independent and direct contact with the Azov movement. Their links to the Azov 
Regiment and/or National Corps have allowed them to become, in one way or another, involved in 
the struggle against the Putin regime that they had fled from. The National Corps apparently helps 
them navigate the bureaucratic process to acquire temporary or permanent resident status in 
Ukraine or even Ukrainian citizenship.140  
 
Overall, Russian right-wing radical circles in Ukraine are small and under-institutionalized. Some 
may not be operating in public. One reason for that is that all Russian political émigrés and 
organizations in Ukraine even if they are outspokenly anti-Putinist are watched upon with 
security services. For instance, it has been alleged that the Belarusian KGB and/or the Russian FSB 
may be directing one of the most notorious recent far-right immigrants in Ukraine, the above Azov 
possible links to security services.141 Russian right-wing radicals who moved from Russia to 
Ukraine have largely migrated as individuals or families rather than in groups. If they do join the 
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To accommodate and attract combat-ready right-wing Russian émigrés who have moved to 
political party, National Corps, has become a major medium 
-right political milieu. The leadership of the Azov movement recognizes itself publicly 
in its role as a facilitator of the legalization of foreign volunteers not only Russian ones serving, 
either as legal residents or as new citizens of Ukraine, in the Ukrainian armed forces.142 
 
Contacts of the Azov Movement with BORN 
 
of the notorious Russian right-wing terrorist groupuscule Boevaia organizatsiia russkikh 
natsionalistov (Combat Organization of Russian Nationalists  BORN). This semi-clandestine 
organization was founded by the Russian far-right activists Nikita Tikhonov and Ilia Goriachev in 
2008 as a paramilitary branch of the Russian ultra-nationalist political party Russkii Obraz (Russian 
embers committed a number of political murders; their 
victims included Judge Eduard Chuvashov of the Moscow City Court, lawyer Stanislav Markelov 
(1974-2009), and several prominent Antifa activists. BORN discontinued its activities after the 
arrest of Nikita Tikhonov and Yevgenia Khasis in November 2009 and was [officially] eliminated in 
143  
 
political wing, Russian Image, once had been a project promoted by the Kremlin. According to 
Robert Horvath,  
 
[D]espite its extremism, Russkii Obraz 
ector of the 
political arena. During 2008-2009, Russkii Obraz collaborated closely with pro-
controlled public sphere [...]. Russkii Obraz
was consecrated by [among others] SPAS, a cable television station dedicated to the 
Russia functionary and Russian Presidential Administration department head] Ivan 
Demidov, SPAS provided a platform for pro-Kremlin ideologues like Nataliya 
Narochnitskaya and Aleksandr Dugin [see below]. But SPAS also offered 
employment to two leaders of Russkii Obraz: [Russian Image ideologue Dmitrii] 
Taratorin, who was appointed head of political programming; and [Ilya] Goryachev, 
discussion with high-ranking state functionaries like Sergei Popov, an influential 
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Moreover, since 2014, some far-right activists linked to BORN and Russian Image have been active 
in the so- -created eastern Ukrainian separatist 
entity.145 Hanna Hrytsenko detailed the ties between the now defunct BORN and the Azov 
movement.146 For instance, Hrytsenko describes the cases of the Russian neo-Nazis Aleksandr 
Parinov and Roman Zheleznov, who were formerly linked to Tikhonov. Parinov had permanently 
moved to Ukraine years before the Euromaidan, possibly in 2009.147  
 
After that, nothing was known about him until two independent investigations by 
Mediazona and Novaia Gazeta found Parinov in the Russian Corps of the Ukrainian 
volunteer battalion Azov. The Corps was supposedly headed by another well-known 
Russian neo-Nazi who had also collaborated with [BORN cofounder Ilia] Goriachev, 
the military service, but a volunteer of the Azov press service.148 
 
Zheleznov moved from Russia to Ukraine in June 2014. While still in Russia, from 2007, he had been 
involved with a circle of fascists that later formed BORN. As part of this group, he was asked to 
gather information about Russian anti-
Goriachev, who later became a leader of BORN, used this information for establishing a cooperation 
with Nikita Ivanov and Pavel Karpov, two employees of the Presidential Administration who were 
interested in such intelligence.149 Hrytsenko further explained that  
 
[a]ccording to Anna Sennik, the leader of the information service of the regiment 
[Roman] Zheleznov's successful entry into Ukraine was facilitated by Ihor 
Mosiichuk, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian far right organization, Social-National 
Assembly [SNA] (of which the PU is a member). At the time [in summer 2014, 
Mosiichuk] was an [elected] member of the Kyiv City Council and [the Azov 
Battalion] deputy commander [...]. Zheleznov was met at the Kyiv airport Boryspil 
by representatives of the SNA [...]. In January 2016, Zheleznov and the Azov Civil 
Corps (an association of civil sympathizers of the unit) disrupted a rally in Kyiv in 
memory of Markelov as well as Baburova and tried to disrupt the ensuing press 
conference on right-wing radicalism.150 
 
Hrytsenko has also described another episode about Russian involvement in the Azov movement: 
 
Aleksei Baranovskii, a friend of the Tikhonov and Khasis family, a journalist and 
coordinator of the right-
expert on national issues for the pro-Kremlin and anti-migrant youth movement 
 
145 evoi organizatsii russkikh natsionalistov: kontakty i konteksty v do- 
13:1 (2016): 180-193. 
146 Politychna krytyka, 24 February 2015, 
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lawyer Markelov with champagne and was a witness in the murder case. 
Baranovskii moved to Kyiv in the fall of 2013 and has worked as a Ukrainian 
journalist ever since until March 2014 at Kommersant-Ukraina, and, after the 
Ukrainian edition of the publication had closed, for Delo.ua. Baranovskii traveled to 
the Azov [Battalion] as a journalist stressing in his report about the battalion for 





The Special Case of the Pseudo-UNA of Eduard Kovalenko 
 
A different instance of Russian involvement with a seemingly Ukrainian ultra-nationalist group did 
not involve genuine far-right cooperation, as described above and below, but rather was a 
disinformation operation likely guided from Moscow. In the mid-2000s, the Kremlin and/or 
Ukrainian pro-Kremlin forces tried to instrumentalize an artificially created, supposedly fascist 
-democratic electoral uprisings, liberal nationalism, and 
resistance against Russia. The principal protagonist of this affair was the dubious Ukrainian 
political activist Eduard Kovolenko (b. 1965) who was, at one point, introduced as party chairman 
of the seemingly virtual group Social-Patriotic Assembly of Slavs.152 The Kovalenko episode touches 
upon a variety of topics in Russian-Ukrainian relations during the last 20 years and connects certain 
aspects of the Orange Revolution of 2004 with the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014, as well as 
with the prisoners exchanges between the Ukrainian government and Russian satellite statelets in 
the Donets Basin in 2019-2020. 
 
In the wake of the 2004 presidential electoral campaign, a split-off from the Ukrainian far-right 
party UNA that used the same name was either created or infiltrated by pro-Kremlin agents. The 
pseudo- -Western political camp. A 
leading expert on the international far right, Anton Shekhovtsov, summarized this operation on his 
blog in 2014:  
 
In the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, which resulted in a dramatic stand-
off between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, a certain Eduard Kovalenko, 
leader of the virtual far right party Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), declared 
that he and his party would hold a march in support of Yushchenko as a presidential 
candidate. Yushchenko's office immediately replied that they never needed that 
support and did their best to distance themselves from Kovalenko's sordid initiative. 
Yet Yushchenko's office could not hamper that march and, on 26 June 2004, 
Kovalenko proceeded. At the meeting that was held after the march, Kovalenko 
-wing nationalist party, are supporting the only one 
candidate from the right-wing forces: Viktor Yushchenko. One Ukraine, one nation, 
then the leader of the [real] UNA-UNSO, the whole event was staged by Viktor 
Medvedchuk, then the Head of the Presidential Administration (under President 
Leonid Kuchma), who was later involved in the electoral fraud in favor of pro-
(and still is) also known for his close personal relations with Vladimir Putin who is 
support to Yushchenko under the Nazi-like flags, he was expected to discredit the 
democratic candidate in the eyes of Western observers. Luckily for Yushchenko, 
however, the Western media largely did not buy into that frame-up and ignored it.153  
 
 
152 Politrada, n.d., politrada.com/dossier/Eduard-Vladimirovich-
Kovalenko/ 
153 -Russian network behind the anti- Anton 




After the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas in spring 2014, the supposed pro-
Ukrainian, ultra-nationalist, and Yushchenko supporter Kovalenko turned, despite his earlier 
actions, into an anti-government and anti-war activist. He was arrested for his calls to Ukrainians to 
abstain from military service and the fight in the Donbas.154 According to a report by Halya Coynash 
from May 2017, 
 
Ukrainian whose involvement in fake far-right movements and separatist scandals 
dates back to at least 2004. The Henichesk District Court found Kovalenko guilty of 
formations (Article 114-
imprisonment. Kovalenko was taken into custody in the courtroom. The criminal 
charges against Kovalenko were brought over an anti-mobilization rally which he 
organized on January 27, 2015. During the rally, he issued an ultimatum, 
threatening that, if mobilization did not stop in Ukraine, the protesters would block 
roads and seize control of the military recruitment office, police and administrative 
buildings. In November 2016, [Kovalenko] was reported as being behind a petition 
to Serhei Aksyonov, installed as Crimean leader by Russian soldiers in February 
 of a supposed 
demand from local Ukrainian Bulgarians for a Bulgarian autonomy. The report from 




West Ukrainian and a formerly anti-Semitic journalist, was scheduled to receive the Aachen Peace 
Prize a controversial award given by a German non-governmental organization for pacifist 
activism. Kotsaba had been selected because of his public calls to Ukrainian men to hide from 
obligatory military service during the ongoing war in the Donbas. He was subsequently accused of 
and wanted for illegal propaganda by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies.  
 
As a result, Kotsaba temporarily moved to Germany and became acquainted with left-wing political 
circles. Among his contacts was Die Linke (The Left) Bundestag deputy Andrej Hunko, who has links 
-nominated Kotsaba for the Aachen Peace Prize. After his 
nomination, an older video resurfaced on the internet, however, in which Kotsaba outlined his 
rabidly anti-Semitic views. Publicly embarrassed, the Aachen prize commi
nomination for the peace award.156 
 
voiced far-right views. Before the Orange Revolution, Kovalenko had obtained a certain public 
 
154 -War Political Prisoner Eduard Kovalenko Appealed to International Organisations for 
Stalker Zone, 10 January 2019, www.stalkerzone.org/ukrainian-anti-war-political-prisoner-eduard-
kovalenko-appealed-to-international-organisations-for-support/. 
155 - Human Rights in Ukraine, 
22 May 2017, khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1494888580. 




profile as an official Ukrainian ultra- 157 Since 
2014, the real UNA-UNSO that Kovalenko had been claiming to represent in 2004, participated with 
its 
case took an even stranger turn when the by then arrested and once demonstratively fascist 
Ukrainian activist was transferred to Russia as part of one of the offic
enacted as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations known as the Minsk Process. Halya 
Coynach reported in early 2020: 
 
While Russia has claimed that the 29 December exchange was purely between 
Ukraine and the so-
agreed during the meeting on 9 December 2019 between Putin and Ukrainian 
President Volodymyr Zelensky. Few would, in any case, dispute that it is the Kremlin 
and its people who make all decisions regarding the release of prisoners and 
inclusion of people to be handed over to Russia / the Russian-
2004] had been forgotten, especially since his activities 
Crimea and military aggression in Donbas were quite different. [...] While Kovalenko 
emanded, UNA-UNSO 
was led in the 1990s by the even more notorious provocateur Dmytro Korchinsky, 
who was reportedly a KGB agent back in Soviet times. While the Kremlin, or its 
friends, like Medvedchuk, were engaging individuals like Kovalenko to push their 
-right Russian 
organizations, especially that of fascist ideologue Alexander Dugin, were heavily 
involved from as far back as 2006, in recruiting and training Ukrainians with pro-
Russian and right-wing views in Donbas, Crimea and, doubtless, other parts of 
-
was in Donbas that most of the militant leaders, whether Ukrainian or Russian, were 
known for their far-right, sometimes neo-Nazi views.158 
 
The Kovalenk - -
Ukrainian domestic affairs rather than of genuine Ukrainian far-right cooperation with Russian 
re, to an unusually high 
degree, related to purposeful disinformation and manipulation.  
 
whom Coynash mentioned above  was less instrumental in nature. It is more illustrative of certain 
touching points between Ukrainian far-
htforward case of an obviously hired pro-Russian 
 
 
157 Denis K - Denis 
Kazanskyi, 3 January 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2q8FAznF_w. 
158 






The above-mentioned contacts between pro-Ukrainian Russian neo-Nazi activists within the 
Ukrainian far right are when viewed as part of the contextualization proposed here altogether 
not that surprising. A peculiarly non-imperialist brand of racism held by Russians fleeing to Ukraine 
explain their cooperation with the Ukrainian far right. Moreover, such cooperation happened 
between politically marginal, numerically small, and rather new Russian émigré groups in Ukraine 
constitutes, in contrast, an ideologically and motivationally more complicated story. It links a 
Ukrainian ultra-nationalist grouping, Bratstvo, and its well-
certain relevant (and not merely marginal) anti-Ukrainian Russian political actors within Russia. In 
the aftermath of the 2004 Orange Revolution, there was for about two years a curious association 
between the UNA-UNSO co-founder and once prominent Ukrainian far-
rious Russian fascist 
ideologue.159  
 
Already before this official temporary alliance in 2005-
moskals 
[pejorative term for Muscovites or Russians] since about 1992, in one way or another, in various 
regions [...]. It has always been a difficult relationship. We have had illusions that we could do 
160 When the surprised interviewer asked what the purpose of this 
1990s) his UNA-UNSO was across the southwestern Ukrainian border in Moldova, protecting 
Ukrainians living in Transnistria and incidentally supporting pro-Russian Transnistrian separatism 
in the region. 
 
0s were also odd since in the 1990s he had 
made a multitude of anti-
161 The late researcher of Russian nationalism Vladimir 
memoirs of the Chechen War, published in 2005 (in his book Revolution Haute Couture), 
162  
 
s intense cooperation with Dugin (more on this later), there was 
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December 1, 2013, the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist temporarily went into hiding. According to 
different reports, he moved either to Russia and/or Transnistria (controlled by a pro-Russian 
satellite regime).163 According to a press report, he gave a Skype interview from a Russian asylum 
shelter to a Ukrainian television station.164  
 
If his location at that point   were to be confirmed, this would be 
remarkable. During late 2013 and early 2014 the Kremlin media was already conducting its large-
scale disinformation campaign about a grave threat which radical Ukrainian nationalism was 
allegedly posing to Russian speakers in Ukraine. Russian state television and newspapers presented 
the Euromaidan as a fascist, anti-Russian uprising and started to especially demonize the leader of 
the Right Sector, Dmytro Yarosh, as a fascist and allegedly decisive figure in the events playing out 
in Kyiv.  
 
While Yarosh was wanted for arrest in Russia, it may have been that another Ukrainian ultra-
Russia and/or Transnistria. Yet another du
and pro-Russian actors since the 1990s is that during that time from the founding of the UNA-
UNSO in the early 1990s until today
Shukhevych, an iconic figure in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Yuriy Shukhevych is the son of 
Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950), the former chief commander of the UPA and one-time head of the 
radical Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.165 In 2014-2019, Yuriy 
a member of a faction of Oleh Lyashko's loudly patriotic, so-called Radical Party in the Verkhovna 
Rada.166 
 
Bratstvo became a 
member of the Highest Council of the International Eurasianist Movement in Moscow in 2004-
2006.167 The only other Ukrainian included in this group was the head of the Progressive Socialist 
to win 2.93% of the official turnout in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. She was then the premier representative of radical anti-Westernism in Ukraine and has 
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political spectrum and manifestly different in their approaches to Russia, were together listed in the 
directory of members of the Highest Council of the Moscow-based International Eurasianist 
Movement.169 It was also announced in February 200
the Highest Council of the newly created Eurasianist Union of Youth.170 The new organization 
represented the In -
Revolution by way of, among others, creation of several pro-Kremlin youth movements.171 Both of 
these organizations, the International Eurasianist Movement and Eurasianist Youth Union, are led 
by and entirely devoted to the ideas of the notorious Russian fascist publicist and doctor of political 
sciences, Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962).172  
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ly known in Ukraine in 2007 in connection with a scandal that arose 
ermit 
Dugin to enter Ukraine a few months before. In June 2006, Ukraine had declared Dugin persona non 
grata until 2011 for violating Ukrainian law. When he arrived at Simferopol airport in early June 
ganized by the Russian Community of 
Crimea, he was deported back to Russia.173 
 
- -American.174 Dugin describes 
-democratic publicist Ernst Niekisch; 
-war intellectual movement.175 He has also 
made affirmative references to other non-Russian sources including British Satanism, European 
Nouvelle Droite
variation of anti-Western ideas that had their origins outside Russia. Posing as a devout Orthodox 
believer, his major concepts are imported from various Catholic and protestant thinkers from the 
inter- and post-war era in Western Europe.  
 
Despite such  within the Russian nationalist tradition  dubious sources, Dugin, during his 
176 was in the company of a number of highly placed 
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philosopher Olena Semeniaka. However, there seems to have been only one meeting and brief communication 
between Dugin and Semeniaka which is why this connection is not further explored here. See: Leonids 




Russian political and social figures, such as 2004-2008 Minister of Culture Aleksandr Sokolov, 
2001-2015 Federation Council Deputy Speaker Aleksandr Torshin, and Presidential Advisor 
Aslambek Aslakh -Soviet figures, 
177  
 
During the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly and affirmatively wrote about West European fascism. He 
criticized G
became a chapter of the electronic version of his 1997 book, Templars of the Proletariat.178 In the 
article Dugin blamed the fascist movements and regimes of inter-war Europe for being too 
moderate, too incoherent, too soft, and not truly revolutionary. Fascism, argued Dugin, is in 
principle a good idea; but it has never been consistently implemented. According to Dugin, in Russia 
-  
elaborated on why he thinks Russian fascism is a benevolent ideology. He presented the SS as an 
organization with positive characteristics and lamented the break-up of the 1939 alliance between 
Hitler and Stalin as an unfortunate event. The banner of the notorious National-Bolshevik Party that 
Dugin co-founded and led in 1994-1998, together with notorious writer Eduard Limonov (1943-
2020), was an adaptation of the colors of the Nazi flag, with the Soviet hammer-and-sickle symbol 
replacing the black swastika. 
 
Already during the 1990s Dugin became known for his especially strident statements on the future 
of Ukraine. Though they were even by Russian nationalist standards of that time rather 
extravagant, they turned out to be prophe -à-vis Ukraine.179 
For instance, Dugin wrote in his major textbook, Foundations of Geopolitics, first published in 1997 
and reprinted in 2000, that  
 
Ukrainian sovereignty is so negative for Russian geopolitics that it could, in theory, 
spark an armed conflict [...]. Ukraine as a state makes no geopolitical sense 
whatsoever. It has no universal cultural meaning, no geographical distinctiveness or 
ethnic exclusiveness. The historical significance of Ukraine can be derived from its 
okraina
- ..] An absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on 
the Black Sea shores is the total and unlimited control by Moscow of [these shores] 
over their whole stretch from the Ukrainian to the Abkhaz territory.180 
 
In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Dugin published a programmatic article on Ukraine in 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, on January 26, 2005, stating that  
 
Russia has lost Ukraine, and it is not necessary to cover up this sad fact. It will not be 
possible to develop positive relations with the Kyiv of [Viktor] Yushchenko, it is 
 
177 - gnificance of the Rise of 
Russian Politics and Law 47:1 
(2009): 76-89. 
178 Aleksandr Dugin, Tampliery proletariata (Moskva: Arktogeia, 1997), 
http://www.my.arcto.ru/public/templars/. 
179 Aleksandr Dugin,  (Moskva: 
Evraziia, 2000): 348-349, 799. 
180 Tsentr konservativnykh issledovanii, 13 
September 2009, http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/books/130909011417.xhtml. 
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irresponsible and historically criminal to dream about it. We are dealing with an 
ession to NATO is a 
matter of the very near future. Therefore, Russia has to support the federalization of 
Ukraine, to use all its influence to create in this brotherly country a south-eastern 
geopolitical zone aimed at autonomy from an anti-Russian and pro-American Kyiv. 
In addition, certain steps should be taken already now to create a new political 
opposition to the Yushchenko regime, using all the contradictions in his rule, all clan 
frictions, and political mistakes. If Moscow has lost power in Ukraine, it should do 
everything possible to form a real, effective, and efficient Eurasian opposition 
there.181 
 
(razmezhevanie) with the prospect that eastern and southern Ukraine would de facto if not de 
jure become part of Russia.182  
 
s explicit anti-Ukrainian statements make his temporarily official cooperation with the 
prominent Ukrainian ultra- Bratstvo party seem paradoxical. This 
connection was unnatural in terms of both Russian and Ukrainian extreme right ideologies, in 
Youth Union rally on September 21, 2005 on Slavic Square in Moscow on the 625th anniversary of 
183 In a 2005 interview with an inquisitive investigator 
from the website Censor.net  
 
Censor.net: 
Union, which advocates the establishment of the Eurasian Empire of Russia, Ukraine 
organization become possible? 
 
 The Eurasianist movement, led by Dugin, is trying to establish 
relations between nationalists of different nations. There is nothing surprising 
about it. 
 
Censor.net: How do you see the future of Russia and Ukraine? Do the two countries 
have the possibility of a common future? 
 
The main problem is that, in any family, the relations between 
brothers are very complicated. There is never a cloudless relationship in such a 
situation. In addition, there is obvious competition between Russia and Ukraine in 
the post-Soviet space. Ukraine, of course, would like to dominate this space 
someday. But the future of Ukrainian-Russian relations is determined first of all by 
the fact that Slavs are discriminated against in the modern world [...]. The big 
 
181 RG.ru, 26 January 2005, 
https://rg.ru/2005/01/26/yushenko-geopolitika.html. 
182  Mezhdunarodne 
evraziiskoe dvizhenie, 22 August 2006. med.org.ru/article/3223. 
183 
5:1 (2009): 141. 
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political forces, the American and European bureaucracy deny any national state 
sovereignty. The only real way to resist these forces is through joint efforts and 
actions. Of course, the Slavs have a common future. If there is a future at all, then 
only a common one.184 
 
In summer 2005, the Bratstvo 
Dmitrii Surkov, pro-Putinist political technologist Gleb Pavlovskii, and the leader of the pro-Putin 
Nashi of lectures for Nashi
camp on Lake Seliger.185  
protests, i.e. how to prevent actions of civil disobedience similar to the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine or Rose Revolution in Georgia.186  within 
the context of Ukrainian far right politics.  
 
It was also a problem for the Ukraine-born writer, former leader of the National-Bolshevik Party of 
-
Limonov were arrested together after a joint street protest in Moscow.187 At that time, Limonov was 
part of the Russian opposition and proclaimed anti-
collaboration with Nashi in 2005 led Limonov to discontinue his contacts with Bratstvo. Ironically, 
Ukrainian nati
collaboration with a particular  i.e. the Putinist  branch of Russian nationalism. Interestingly 
enough, Limonov later himself turned pro- 188 
 
About these contacts between Ukrainian and Russian ultra-nationalists, Hanna Hrytsenko reports a 
-based National-Bolshevik Party and one-time activist for the above-mentioned 
-party, secretly cooperating with the Russian Presidential Administration:  
 
and the Eurasianist Youth Union, claims that by the end of 2013 a combat unit 
consisting of right-wing youth had grown out of the [Ukrainian separatist micro-
out, played a special role in the events of the so-
alleged uprising in Eastern and Southern Ukraine in spring 2014].189 
 
Yet another curious facet of this zigzag story is that, in his quoted 2005 interview for Censor.net, 
 
184 - ob Censor.net, 11 November 2005, 
https://censor.net.ua/resonance/2162/korchinskiyi_u_slavyan__obschee_buduschee_esli_ono_voobsche_est_
rosbalt.  




187 Podrobnosti, 2003, 
https://podrobnosti.ua/91773-v-moskve-zaderzhany-limonov-korchinskij-i-semochnaja-gruppa-telekanala-
11.html. 




e tried to create one powerful opposition bloc. But 
after Yanukovych decided to be not the leader of the opposition but the leader of a small party by 
signing a Memorandum with [then President Viktor] Yushchenko, we wanted to create at least a 
radical-oppo 190 
an idea 
most Ukrainian nationalists opposed.191 
his one-time declarative support for Yanukovych, when Yanukovych became president in 2010, 
Bratstvo ended up with criminal cases brought to court against them. 
misdeeds i
192 Whether true or not, Bratstvo 
International Eurasianist Movement after three members of the Eurasianist Youth Union 
desecrated Ukrainian state symbols on Mount Hoverla in western Ukraine in October 2007.193 Since 
 public ties to representatives close to the Kremlin 
and has returned to traditional Ukrainian right-wing activism and publicism. 
190 -  
191 -  
192 kyy, lite Telekanal ZIK, 3 June 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-s5nIIL4Os. 
193 Liga.net, October 2007, 
https://news.liga.net/politics/news/bratstvo-obyavilo-rozysk-vandalov-iz-evraziyskogo-soyuza-molodezhi. 
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Ukraine's Far Right and Pro-Kremlin Actors in Ukraine 
 cooperation with anti-Ukrainian Russian actors was an 
ra-
nationalists whose actions and announcements have also been contradictory. The following 
-nationalists.  
Ukraine's Far Right and Russia-Related Oligarchs 
The Azov Movement, Medvedchuk, Muraev and Others 
Bratstvo and some other activists were trying to block 
the entrance to the main office of the TV channel ZIK in Kyiv.194 These nationalists were protesting 
the sale of this formerly pro-Ukrainian television station to an entity related to Ukrainian politician 
and oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk (b. 1954). Medvedchuk is well known for his close ties to the 
-nationalist protest 
against the transfer of ZIK
building. The ultra-nationalist  (National Squads) affiliated with the Azov 
came not to protest but to defend the operation of the TV channel 
under its new owners and with its new programmatic orientation. According to the Azov 
195 
Protection services are, to 
groups. Yet, this action was peculiar as a notorious representative of Putin in Ukraine, Medvedchuk, 
had become the new de facto owner of the TV channel (and the station was closed in 2021 for this 
reason).196  
Two years after this episode, in May 2020, the same National Corps that had protected 
Platform  197 In fact, Ukrainian right-wing radicals, in contrast to the Azov 
ing a Medvedchuk-affiliated station, have repeatedly attacked pro-
194 ZIK, 3 March 2018, 
https://zik.ua/news/2018/03/28/blokuvannya_telekanalu_ziku_yak_vse_rozpochynalosya_1294755; 
Slovo i Dilo, 3 March 2018, 
https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2018/03/28/novyna/suspilstvo/korchynskyj-zayavyv-pro-piketuvannya-
telekanalu-zik. 
195  3 March 2018, 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/03/27/7175935/
Slovo i Dilo, 3 March 2018, 
https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2018/03/28/pogljad/suspilstvo/telekanal-zik-oxoronoyu-naczdruzhyn-yaki-
povnovazhennya-ta-dozvoleno-aktyvistam. 
196  kil ka zhurnalistiv zaiavyly pro zvil Radio Svoboda, 9 
June 2019, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-kozak-kupyv-zik/29999891.html
Ukrinform, 14 June 2019, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-
society/2721693-vlasnik-112-ukraina-ta-newsone-kupiv-ise-j-telekanal-zik.html. 





Russian TV channels. For instance, in 2016 due to pro-Russian rhetoric on the popular Inter TV 
channel, representatives of the Azov movement blocked its building and organized actions against 
it across Ukraine.  
 
media outlets related to pro-Russian oligarchs and politicians. Among the latter, for example, is 
Dmytro Muraev who was a frequent guest on ZIK after its pro-Russian turn and was or is co-owner 
of other pro-Russian TV channels 112.ua (shut down in 2021), Nash (Ours), and NewsOne (shut 
down in 2021). In spite of their generally anti-nationalist and partly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, these 
media conglomerates, along with other TV channels linked to various Ukrainian oligarchs with 
ambivalent political stances, have for several years given considerable airtime to Azov movement 
representatives.198  
 
national electoral results that is usually far below the 5% threshold necessary to enter the 
Verkhovna Rada
1% or less among the survey respondents.199 The contradiction bet
TV exposure and low political weight repeats an earlier pattern of heavy media presence of the then 
extra-parliamentary and nationally marginal Svoboda party on various TV channels close to the 
Party of Regions during the period 2010-2012 (see below).  
 
Moreover, the surprisingly high interest of pro-Russian and ambivalent oligarchic mass media for 
the National Corps, as a minor Ukrainian party, has led not only to a disproportionate presence of 
 
and discussion shows.200 One of the especially notorious informal leaders of the Azov movement, 
the above-mentioned former Belarusian and Russian neo-Nazi activist and émigré Sergei Korotkikh 
(Ukr.: Serhiy Korotkykh) too has been benefitting, over the last years, from unusually high attention 
in relatively pro-Russian mass media.201 As indicated, this surprising collaboration is reminiscent of 
an earlier strange episode in the history of post- ght. 
 
Svoboda and Yanukovych 
 
campaign manager, Paul Manafort, in Ukraine came under scrutiny.202 Manafort had advised 
 
198 E.g.: NewsOne. https://www.youtube.com/c/newsoneua/search?query= ;  
199 




200 NewsOne, 20 May 2016 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lt0DhHKQGKQ. 
201 See:  
202 Slate, 28 April 2016. https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2016/04/paul-manafort-isnt-a-gop-retread-hes-made-a-career-of-reinventing-tyrants-and-
despots.html#lf_comment=500595474
BBC Ukraine, 30 July 2018, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-45003132
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Yanukovych in 2007-2009 in preparation for his successful 2010 Ukrainian presidential election 
bid. Manafort apparently recommended, among other things, to play on political polarization in 
Ukraine. He seems to have recommended to the Party of Regions to use anti-Semitic and anti-
-
with the 
southern regions to vote for pro-Russian candidates and the Party of Regions.203 
 
perhaps inspired by Manafort involved even direct financial support 
suspected ever since the rise of Svoboda in 2012. Yet, it was only documented and fully came to 
light after Viktor Yanukovych's February 2014 escape from Ukraine.204  
 
In August 2016, Serhiy Leshchenko a well-known Ukrainian investigative journalist, 
anticorruption activist, and then member of parliament made public evidence from the black 
bookkeeping of the Party of Regions. The evidence had been found at Yanukovych's former estate at 
Mezhihiria near Kyiv in 2014. Leshchenko posted the photograph of a table of unofficial expenses of 
the Party of Regions that listed payments not only to Manafort, but also recorded a 2010 transfer of 
US$200,000 to the Svoboda party, its most vicious political opponent. When publishing this 
document, Leshchenko indicated that this was not the only such incident and that there may be 
evidence of additional payments during the years of 2007-2009 before Yanukovych became 
President in spring 2010.205  
 
an editor of the left-wing Kyiv Commons magazine, already started to publicly accuse Svoboda and 
the Party of Regions of unofficial cooperation.206 That was because  
recommendation  Yanukovych and his party not only supported, in secret, Svoboda with direct 
financial transfers. The Party of Regions and its affiliated oligarchs with their influential TV 
channels markedly increased the media presence of Svoboda.207 The purpose of promoting a 
marginal and, to many voters, yet unknown party was to shake up the entire political party 
with a 2012 parliamentary election victory for his Party of Regions. 
 
Apparently, 
strengthen Svoboda and thereby split the nationalist opposition into moderate and extremist 
camps. The rise of Svoboda was also supposed to create a scarecrow for the Par
 
BuzzFeed.News, 3 November 2019, 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/mueller-report-secret-memos-1. 
203 Manafort Elected 
Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty, 27 July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/on-eve-of-
trial-a-deeper-glimpse-into-how-paul-manafort-elected-ukraine-s-president/29394601.html. 
204 Chesno, 1 Januray 2020, https://www.chesno.org/post/3763/. 
205 Hromadske.ua, 19 
August 2016, https://hromadske.ua/posts/leshchenko-u-chornii-bukhhalterii-partii-rehioniv-ie-platezhi-
dlia-partii-svoboda.  
206 Vitaliy At - , 13 May 2011, 
https://commons.com.ua/uk/osoblivosti-natsional-radikalnoyi-dzh/. 





anti-Westernism and authoritarianism. There appears to have been a long-term scheme to grow the 
popularity of Svoboda chairman, Oleh Tiahnybok, to such a degree that he would make it, together 
with Yanukovych, into the second round of the next regular presidential election in 2015. The 
calculation was that Yanukovych might not be able to win a second time against a moderate 
nationalist in the run-off, but he would be able to do so against a radical nationalist.  
In 2010-2012, the most visible sign of this strategy was a rapid rise in the presence of the Svoboda 
party in Ukrainian mass media controlled by various oligarchs. This concerned, above all, the 
various popular political evening TV talk shows where representatives of the extra-parliamentary 
and largely Galicia-based Svoboda became regular guests. As Table 2 composed by Anton 
Shekhovtsov indicates: Once Yanukovych became president in spring 2010 and until November 
2012, the number of appearances of Svoboda representatives on popular TV talk shows of the two 
channels under his most direct influence increased rapidly. 
Table 2. Popular political talk-shows that prominently included at least one participant from 






2nd half of 2005 1 No shows No shows 
1st half of 2006 1 No shows No shows 
2nd half of 2006 0 No shows No shows 
1st half of 2007 0 No shows No shows 
2nd half of 2007 0 No shows No shows 
1st half of 2008 1 No shows No shows 
2nd half of 2008 0 No shows 0 
1st half of 2009 0 No shows 2 
2nd half of 2009 1 1 2 
1st half of 2010 0 6 6 
2nd half of 2010 3 10 7 
1st half of 2011 3 11 10 
2nd half of 2011 4 5 5 
1st half of 2012 3 3 7 
In sum 17 36 39 
This growth in media attention came even though Tiahnybok had performed unimpressively in the 
2010 presidential election; he received 1.43% of the vote. To be sure, his party had been more 
successful in some 2009-2010 regional and local elections than in previous national parliamentary 
elections (See Table 1). Yet, any notable gains in Svoboda
elections or measured in opinion polls, before the start of its national promotion by Yanukovych-
influenced TV channels had been confined to the three Galician oblasts of Ternopil, Ivano-
regional improvements in western Ukraine did not translate into wider Ukrainian support for the 
s.  
208 Forum 
10:1 (2013): 22-63. Data collection ended on 5 May 2012. 
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Two years later, Svoboda was able to reap the gains from the manifest media support by TV 
situation, and some other political circumstances favorable to it. Svoboda sharply increased its 
national share in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of October 2012. While typically garnering 
less than 1% of electoral support in previous parliamentary polls, its vote share jumped to 10.44% 
in the proportional part of the 2012 Rada elections.209  
Svoboda s support, however, halved twice in the following 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections. 
It first fell to 4.71% in the October 2014 Verkhovna Rada poll. And then, despite a unification of all 
major Ukrainian far right parties under the umbrella of Svoboda within a single list, its voter 
support further declined to 2.15% in the July 2019 snap parliamentary election. This embarrassing 
drop in numbers occurred despite new more favorable electoral demographic conditions. In 2014 
and 2019, a large part of those Ukrainian citizens who would have overwhelmingly not voted for 
the Galicia-based Svoboda party were living in Crimea, the occupied territories of the Donbas, or 
Russia where they could not participate in the elections. Thus, the overall decline in popular 
-nationalist party was even steeper than indicated by the 
percentages reported for the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections.  
Since then, Svoboda has not quite fallen to the lows of its pre-2012 electoral performance in 
-nationalists have returned to the fringes of Ukrainian 
politics.210 Paradoxically, in the post-Soviet Ukrainian far right's history, it was only during the reign 
-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, that Svoboda received briefly support 
higher than the 5% entrance barrier for parliament. It was only during the presidency of a man who 
ar right was able to form its own faction in the 
Verkhovna Rada. During all other national elections, its support remained regional and scanty. 
-connected Oligarchs 
There were other dubious episodes in the history of Tiahnybok
before Yanukovych fell, in early 2013, Svoboda had come publicly out against exploitation of shale 
gas reserves in Ukraine. This was a position that aligned closely with above-introduced Viktor 
211 When the 
Western companies Shell and American ExxonMobil started exploring shale gas development, 
Svoboda  212 Some 
observers speculated that Svoboda s actions may have been designed to promote the interests of 
the notorious pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch, Dmytro Firtash. It was known that Firtash was a 
209 d rezul tativ radykal nykh pravykh na vyborakh 
1994- Ukranian Centre of Social Data, 2016, https://socialdata.org.ua/svoboda-proti-vsikh-
korotkiy-oglyad-r/. 
210 - and Post-  
211  Radio Svoboda, 1 February 2013, 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/24890573.html. 
212 UNIAN, 18 January 2013, 
https://www.unian.ua/politics/740428-svoboda-proti-vidobutku-slantsevogo-gazu-na-donbasi.html. 
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business partner of one of the biggest donors of the Svoboda party and its 2012-2014 Verkhovna 
Rada d 213 
Certain forms of indirect collaboration between Svoboda and pro-Russian politicians as well as 
Moscow-connected businesspeople continued after the victory of the Euromaidan. In September 
2015, Ukrainian journalist Oleksandr Paskhover published an investigation on the Svoboda party:  
In May 2015, in connection with the opening of the [legal] case against Serhii Kliuev, 
Poroshenko Bloc People's Deputy Serhiy Leshchenko discovered an interesting 
document. It was a copy of the correspondence between the EU High Commissioner 
Catherine Ashton and the Svoboda  
the victory of the Euromaidan]. Thanks to the received copies, Leshchenko learned 
that the lists of Ukrainian officials under Yanukovych, against whom the EU imposed 
personal sanctions, had been prepared not in Brussels, but in Kyiv, to be more 
precise in the Prosecutor General's Office [then led by Svoboda
And here is what surprised Leshchenko: initially 18 people were included in the list, 
and later [the list] was supplemented by four more old-time politicians (Serhiy 
such odious figures as former head of the presidential administration Serhiy 
gnate and partner of RosUkrEnergo Dmytro 
with a deal to acquire drilling rigs for oil production (the multimillion-dollar case of 
the so- uev were not included in the blacklist 
conspiracy between the Svoboda 
sident yet. As a result, 
assets of Yanukovych's comrades-in-arms  those who fell under the suspicion of 
ined  as if 
  214 
post-Soviet politics. However, in this case, the representative of a loudly anti-Russian and 
manifestly ultra- Svoboda, was apparently shielding from 
sanctions certain oligarchs and politicians who had publicly pro-Russian profiles and known 
relations to Moscow. 
Ukraine's Far Right and Russia-Related Political Actors 
In connection with the victory of the pro-Western Revolution of Dignity and start of the Russian-
those with partners in Russia, were aborted. Soon, however, new foreign relations started being 
established, mainly by the increasingly ambitious Azov movement. There are various reasons for 
213 - Novoe vremia, 7 
September 2015, https://nv.ua/ukr/publications/shcho-soboju-predstavljaje-vo-svoboda-doslidzhennja-nv-
67371.html.  
214 -  
49
international networker. It can be, among others, explained by the relative youthfulness of its 
leaders, non-
 
Shariy and Azov 
in the Russian-language videoblogs of the notorious anti-Maidan blogger Anatoliy Shariy. The 
popular commentator has his own party named after him in Ukraine. Yet he lives outside the 
country and is often accused of implementing a Kremlin-inspired political agenda via the 
internet.215  
-nationalist and, some would say, anti-Ukrainian 
positions, his early comments on the Azov Regiment were, in stark contrast to the general ideology 
of his widely watched video shows, ambivalent, documental, and nonjudgmental. Shariy has also 
nents and provided a platform for Azov representatives to 
216 s program 
217 
Yurchenko heads the conservative wing of the movement, Orden (Order), which also has 
connections with the Svoboda party and the Tradition and Order (TiP) group. 
In 2017, Shariy released two videoblogs that may be seen as partial apologies for the Azov 
-governmental vigilante group, the National Squads. One of his videos 
included a brief interview with Russian political émigré Aleksei Levkin, a member of the Russian 
Center and a self-titled ideologist of the National Squads (see above). Before moving to Ukraine, 
Levkin had been a member of the party . The RNE was founded in the 
-known openly neo-Nazi political organization which used a red 
swastika as its main symbol.218  
Numerous Russian paramilitary volunteers from RNE have actively taken part in the Donbas war.219 
One of the earliest Ukrainian leaders of the eastern Ukrainian separatist movement in spring 2014 
and first so-
While born in Ukraine and a Ukrainian citizen, Hubarev is a Russian ultra-nationalist. He was 
previously a member of the Russian RNE and received training in one of its camps. There are 
photographs and videos of Hubarev in the black RNE uniform with its red swastika.220  
215 Mil.in.ua, 18 July 2019, 
https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/fejky-sharyya-kak-sharyj-pokr-d1-8bvaet-ubyjcz-ukraynczev-chast-1/
Mil.in.ua, 18 July 2019, 
https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/fejky-sharyya-razoblachenye-propagandysta-chast-2/. 
216 Anatoliy Shariy, 5 July 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qp5ybzq5rg. 
217 Anatoliy Shariy, 24 February 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KY5u4duvMDI.  
218 Anatoliy Shariy, 29 January 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQ36dxjY4cg&t=112s. 
219 
Russie.Nei.Visons 95 (2016), https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/far-right-
conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine. 
220 -  
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Since arriving in Ukraine, the former RNE members and current Azov movement activists, Levkin 
and Korotkikh, have apparently left behind the anti-Ukrainian aspects of the RNE ideology. During 
 mostly interviewed Azov affiliates 
less prominent than Levkin or Yurchenko. He spoke to low-ranking Azov members who may have 
221 Since 2018, however, 
Shariy has switched to actively criticizing the Azov movement. Since 2020, after the formation and 
activation of the Shariy Party, a whole number of conflicts and skirmishes have, moreover, taken 
place between Azov and Shariy supporters in various parts of Ukraine. These confrontations were 
phenomena anymore. 
 
countering communist and pro-Russian demonstrations in Ukraine. For example, from May 2015 to 
October 2018 there were 1,535 public actions of the Azov movement, as recorded in a research 
project by an author of this study. Yet only 51 were directed against communist and pro-Russian 
forces or values in Ukraine. This is, in relative terms, a surprisingly small number of such actions for 
an ultra-nationalist Ukrainian movement.222 
 
It is further worth noting that the Azov movement has received attention and publicity from 
Dmytro Hordon (Russian: Dmitrii Gordon), a famous Ukrainian journalist in the post-Soviet media 
the journalist extensively 
223 the leader of the Azov movement
for the previously mentioned Russian-leaning TV channels, NewsOne and 112.ua.224 These now shut 
down media outlets were under direct or indirect control of pro-Russian oligarchs. In his 
assessments concerning Ukrainian right-wing radicalism, Hordon has criticized the Svoboda party 





Another case of paradoxical cooperation between Ukrainian right-wing radicals and pro-Russian 
actors in Ukraine concerns Illia Kyva, a Verkhovna Rada deputy since 2019 from the party 
Opozytsiyna platforma - Za zhyttia (Opposition Platform - For Life, OPZZh). Since 2019, Kyva has 
become widely known in Ukraine in connection with numerous scandals (one of them a video tape 
showing Kyva masturbating in parliament). In 2014, Kyva received the rank of police major and 
 
221  
222 Unpublished data collected by Taras Tarasiuk and colleagues. The issue problematized here has been 
discussed in such outlets as or 
social networks with Facebook and Telegram. Note that there are no data on the dynamics for the period 
from January to September of 2015 and from January to May of 2018. 
223 V gostiakh u Gordona, n. d., 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paQBjBdAmbY. 
224 Gordon: Nas mogut zhdat' bol'shie potriaseniia  Nash, 21 March 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5w4n6magrqU.  
225 112.UA, 17 March 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LlGgfIS8e8. 
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regional leader of the Right Sector for eastern Ukraine, encompassing the Poltava, Kharkiv, 
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presidential candidate Dmytro Yarosh to public authorities, local governments, and other legal 
entities in Ukraine during the election campaign.234 Then from October 2016 to June 2017, Kyva 
was an advisor to the hawkish Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avavkov.235  
-turn, however. In the parliamentary elections of July 21, 
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OPZZh).236
ed by Viktor Medvedchuk (for 
channel ZIK a station that was said to be controlled by Medvedchuk.237 On January 21, 2020 
s leaders Medvedchuk and 
Vadym Rabinovych, Kyva was elected head of the OPZZh 238  
 
paramilitary youth wing of the OPZZh.239 triots  
have been involved in several clashes with members of the Azov movement.240 As mentioned above, 
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Ukraine's Far Right and Pro-Kremlin Actors Around the World 
 
would, if for some reason desired, be risky for the far right and, if conducted, be hidden as much as 
possible. Post-2014 Ukrainian mainstream politics does not tolerate any collaboration with pro-
Moscow forces, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The above listed cases remained 
situational alliances that do not by themselves suggest stable contacts between pro-Russian forces 
in Ukraine and Ukrainian right-wing radical movements. However, the situation with the Ukrainian 
 
 
Most lines of communication between the Ukrainian far right and pro-Kremlin actors abroad were 
cut after the Revolution of Dignity, annexation of Crimea, and beginning of the conflict in the 
Donbas. Some groups have, nevertheless, since managed to build new or deepen older connections 
with non-Russian European far-right gr
-
243 Many 
Western European radical nationalist groups espouse openly pro-Kremlin views and some even 
have a special allegiance to Vladimir Putin. Moreover, some of these groups have been publicly 
-
Euromaidan far right has maintained or partly expanded its contacts to groups in East-Central 
Europe (Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary), Western Europe (France, Germany, Sweden and Italy), 
and in the United States. 
 
Ukraine's Far Right and Anti-Western Groups in Eastern Europe 
 
The Azov Movement and Its Intermarium Support Group 
 
After Svoboda severed most of its foreign ties in 2014, the Azov movement has become the 
partners abroad rather than continuing older foreign links. The main branch of Azov conducting its 
international affairs is a semi-intellectual off-shot of the movement called the Intermarium Support 
Group.244 The word Intermarium is the Latin variant of the Polish  (Between the Seas). 
A geopolitical scheme of this name was promoted after World War I by Józef Pilsudski who wanted 
to create an anti-German and anti-Soviet alliance of East-Central European nations located between 
the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas.245  
 
-wing communication 
with Croatian, Belarusian, Polish, Hungarian, and Baltic radical nationalists.246 The groups meet 
through conferences about the future of the Trymor'ia (Three Seas) or Mizhmor'ia (Between the 
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244 FOIA Research, 17 January 2019, 
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245 Concept of 
IERES Occasional Papers, March 2019. www.ifri.org/en/publications/publications-ifri/articles-
ifri/imagined-geographies-central-and-eastern-europe-concept. 




Seas) projects.247 -right discourses go beyond the original 
Intermarium plans and seeks to establish a separate civilizational realm in East-Central Europe that 
would be distinct from both the liberal EU and authoritarian Russia. Croatian, Polish, and Ukrainian 
nationalists are also re-envisioning the old Intermarium framework into a novel concept of a multi-
national defense and economic bloc between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas that would be 
oppose both the pluralist West and imperial Eurasia.248 
 
Based on such visions, the Intermarium Support Group has been engaged in a variety of activities 
including discussions and commemoratory events. One of the largest events is the annual 
Intermarium conference in Kyiv.249 Through these and similar initiatives, the international 
department of the Azov movement has become a notable actor in the Eastern European far-right 
intellectual discourse. Over the last years, the Intermarium conferences have brought together 
representatives and participants from 13 Central and Eastern European countries.250 
 
This activity is by itself unremarkable in the context of the present study and does not fall outside 
the framework of predictable Ukrainian nationalist ideology and behavior. However, within this 
ertain non-Ukrainian, right-
radical organizations with possible ties to the Kremlin. Since 2014, most international contacts of 
Russia in Western and non-Western anti-democratic groups across the globe. The official position 
support Moscow. Yet, this is not what is always happening in practice, even after the start of the 
Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014.  
 
Polish and Ukrainian Ultra-Nationalists 
 
In 2019, hackers of the Distributed Denial of Secrets group published 175 gigabytes of mailbox 
information and other data from Russian officials.251 
 the Belarus-born political entrepreneur Aleksandr Usovskii proposed to well-known 
State Duma deputy and head of the CIS Institute, Konstantin Zatulin, a project for creating a 
network of anti-Ukrainian forces in Eastern Europe.252 Usovskii offered to hold rallies in the 
s capital cities during Eastern Partnership Summits. In Poland the project was 
approved, so that Usovskii requested funding.253  
 
-Russian organizations as well 
as far-right groups including Szturm and Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR), the latter one of the 
 
247  12 July 
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largest right-wing radical organizations in Poland.254 These groups agreed to sign a joint declaration 
 
 
This was by itself an unsurprising episode and fits in with the scheme of similar Russian operations 
with other foreign actors. One such operation involved the late Manuel Ochsenreiter (1976-2021), a 
nist Movement and former 
employee of the German Bundestag. In 2018, Ochsenreiter employed two Polish far-right activists 
agents conducted an arson attack on a Hungarian cultural center with the aim to raise tensions 
between the local ethnic Hungarian and Ukrainian population.255 
continued a Soviet-era tradition of clandestine operations by Moscow in the West with the help of 
foreign radical nationalists.256 
 
into the EU, some of its members were in contact with and participated in actions of the Azov 
movement.257 Similarly, Szturm had been relatively pro-Ukrainian in comparison to other 
nationalist movements in the Polish far right. It had well-established contacts with the Azov 
movement in the framework of projects with the Intermarium Support Group.258 At the same time, 
both Polish ultra-nationalist groups became unwitting targets of a Russian secret operation 
conducted by Usovskii who, moreover, was also in contact 
Korotkikh. 
 
Ukraine's Far Right and Pro-Kremlin Actors in Western Europe 
 
Azov and CasaPound 
 
One of the new foreign contacts of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists has been the Italian extra-
parliamentary fascist group CasaPound, which espouses an ambivalent position on the Russian-
Ukrainian war. This movement, largely unknown outside of Italy, started as a commune in Rome for 
spread throughout Italy, and the group became a notable neo-fascist actor in Western Europe.259 
Some members of CasaPound have voiced their support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, while 
 
254 
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others support the Kremlin and have even fought on the side of pro-Russian militants in Eastern 
Ukraine.260  
 
Since 2014, the Carpathian Sich together with the international department of the Azov movement 
CasaPound. According to FOIA 
Research, representatives of the Intermarium Support Group and CasaPound participated in an Acca 
Larentia commemoration in 2019.261 The multi-national meeting of the European far-right 
representatives, including representatives of the Azov movement, was part of a series of yearly 
events held in Rome commemorating the death of three young neo-fascist activists in 1978 in 
violent clashes on the street Acca Larentia.262 
 
As in other such cases, the close cooperation of the Ukrainian far right with CasaPound was 
hand, the leadership of CasaPound had supported the Right Sector during the Maidan revolution.263 
r the start of the Russian-
Ukrainian war.264 
CasaPound and several other far-right organisations held an anti-immigration protest in Milan, and 
265 In 2018, 
CasaPound organized a public discussion in Rome with Aleksandr Dugin. At the occasion, a 
CasaPound representative spoke to the audience, and the Italian far right website The Primacy of the 
National reported, 
 
The intervention of CasaPound's national secretary, Simone Di Stefano, focused on 
anyone, because we always act in the national interest. I very much appreciate the 
exist and endure over time. The world must not be the molasses without identity 
that liberalists and mondialists would like. We would like it to be possible also in 
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Svoboda and West European Rightists
 
As the oldest relevant Ukrainian far right party, Svoboda -right 
groups go back to the 1990s when it still operated under its original name, the Social-National Party 
of Ukraine (SNPU). Early on, the SNPU became affiliated with EuroNat a semi-formal association 
of European far-right parties founded by the French National Front in 1997 and today defunct.267 It 
was then that the SNPU established contact with Jean-Marie Le Pen and the French National Front. 
Meanwhile, the French National Front was also developing relations with the imperialist Russian 
Liberal-Democratic Party led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii.268 For instance, in 2000, at the invitation of 
the SNPU, Le Pen then still chairman of the Front National visited Ukraine.269 Artem Yovenko has 
detailed: 
 
The cooperation [between the two parties] has also evolved on the level of youth 
organizations. A French training camp [...], in addition to the French and Ukrainian 
parties' youth organization representatives, included young nationalists from Italy, 
Spain and Belgium. Some of the objectives of the camp are noted as being to 
strengthen cooperation, exchange ideas, propaganda and organizational work. In-
camp free-time activities included parties, music, sport and French boxing.270 
 
The French far-right activitists may have also helped Svoboda as a party from a non-EU country
gain observer status in the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), founded in 2009.271 
-
wing, populist parties. Its creation was initiated by the Hungarian Jobbik Party (when it was still 
ultra-nationalist) which assembled like-minded EU parties at its 2009 sixth congress in Budapest.272 
After entering parliament in 2012 and before the start of the Euromaidan in late 2013, Svoboda, 
however, had already been expelled from the AENM.273 The expulsion was apparently inspired by 
complaints from Jobbik about Svoboda - 274 This early expulsion was, 
perhaps, a fortunate development for Svoboda. In 2014, the AENM declared that the new Kyiv 
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government, which included Svoboda
275 
 
Svoboda had also various bilateral contacts with Western European far right parties, including 
Italian neo-fascists. In April 2013, two Svoboda enko and Taras Osaulenko, visited 
Italy at the official invitation of the Italian right-wing extremist party Forza Nuova (New Force) to 
discuss possible cooperation between the two parties. A month earlier, in March 2013, Taras 
Osaulenko, who was responsible for Svoboda
a neo-Nazi 
group.276 Roberto Fiore, leader of the Forza Nuova, was among the speakers at this conference.277 
 
The first informal contacts between Svoboda and Fiore had already began in 2009. That year 
Tiahnybok encountered Fiore in Strasbourg while meeting with far-right members of the European 
Svoboda and Forza Nuova.278 Svoboda Forza Nuova youth camp where 
Svoboda and shared his views on how 
279 In June 2013, representatives of the Forza Nuova, 
including Fiore, came to Ukraine to discuss the creation of a new European nationalist movement 
280 
 
And yet since 2014 some of Svoboda Jobbik,  Front 
National Forza Nuova have come out as some of the most vocal Western supporters of 
-à-vis Ukraine.281 In December 2014, Fiore participated in the conference, 
Novorossiia  in Russian-occupied Yalta. There he expressed support 
for Russia's interests in Ukraine.282 Reportedly, Forza Nuova has even sent volunteers to the Donbas 
to fight with pro-Russian separatists against Ukrainian governmental forces.283 Today, Svoboda 
claims to have no links with pro-Putin European parties anymore. One can only suspect that 
Svoboda -right 
parties in Italy, France, Hungary, Britain (British National Party), and Germany (National-
Democratic Party). Most of them have publicly and repeatedly voiced their sympathy or even strong 
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Since 2014 the National Corps has, after Svoboda severed most of its older relations to the West, 
284 
larger ultra-nationalist parties hold pro-Russian positions, much of this international cooperation 
has moved from the political to the subcultural far-right realm. However, this has proven to be 
almost as risky a minefield for Ukrainian ultra-nationalists as the party sphere. Much of the 
Western racist underground is also enchanted by Putin and supports Russian foreign policies as 
-wing domestic rhetoric and measures. 
 
of far-right metal music in Kyiv organized by the Azov movement since 2015. In 2019, American 
white supremacist Greg Johnson and German neo-Nazi Hendrik Möbus visited the concert.285 The 
festival also includes political discussions; Möbus gave a lecture in 2018.286 The bands performing 
at the festival include the Italian band Bronson, affiliated with CasaPound;287 the German neo-Nazi 
band Path of Resistance; anti-Semitic Slovak band Krátky Proces
Russian neo-Nazi hardcore group.288 These and similar groups have not become publicly known for 
making pro-Kremlin statements. Yet, they come from a milieu that is, in many cases, characterized 
by sympathy rather than  
 
A 2019 Kyiv incident illustrates the reputational risks that engagement with Western European 
fascist subcultures poses for the Ukrainian far right in a post-EuroMaidan world.289 In December 
2019, the Ukrainian far-right literary club  (Flame), which also functions as a cultural-
intellectual branch of the Azov movement, organized a public presentation on Franco Freda (b. 
1941), an Italian neo-Fascist and The Disintegration of the System, 
had been translated into Ukrainian and was being sold by .290  
 
Freda is especially appealing to the far-right scene as he combines the qualities of a neo-fascist 
political activist, publicist, and terrorist. While being largely unknown to the wider public, Freda 
has become a cult figure within the international far-
activists were thus eager to bring a translation of his major book to the attention of a wider 
audience in Ukraine. However, as Michael Colborne 
problematic for Ukrainian readers:  
 
remind some Ukrainians of the horrors of the 1930s under Stalin. Private property 
will be Commissario in the 
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original Italian) will oversee everything from foreign affairs and finance to even 
Committee of Management of the Combine.291 
 
e Western system led him to 
-Western efforts. In his investigation into the 
background of the December 2019 Kyiv incident, Colborne notes:  
 
Even more awkwardly for the fiercely anti-Kremlin Azov movement, Franco Freda is 
a dedicated fan of Russian president Vladimir Putin. In an interview in November 
2018, Freda not only spoke highly of pro-Russian far-right populist Matteo Salvini, 
s 
on




It was remarkable, moreover, that Freda, though having made these statements after the start of the 
Russian-Ukrainian war in spring 2014, would still be embraced and his work translated by activists 
of Uk -
Mohyla Academy, a university highly regarded by moderate and radical Ukrainian nationalists alike. 
 but the activists went on with 
40 people and presented the book, creating a scandal within and outside the university.
 
291 -  
292 -
Razza." Estreme Conseguenze, 29 November 2018. estremeconseguenze.it/2018/11/29/fedele-alla-razza/; 




Conclusions: Contradictions and Risks of International Cooperation 
among Far-Right Groupings 
 
Our outline does not cove -Soviet 
-Russian 
Russophile right-wing groups were only scantily presented here and need further research. 
However, our study illustrates diverging backgrounds and modes of paradoxical cooperation 
between Ukrainian radical nationalists and Russian or Russia-related actors.  
 
Our sketch points to the changing contexts of the Ukrainian far-  with Russian 
nationals, with Moscow, or with pro-Kremlin actors in the different historical phases of (a) the 
transitional 1990s, (b) the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005-2010, (c) the presidency of 
Viktor Yanukovych in 2010-2014, and (d) the period after the victory of the Euromaidan as well as 
start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014. During the 1990s, the relations between the newly 
independent Ukrainian and Russian states where not yet determined. This fluid situation allowed 
for the UNA- s almost simultaneous paramilitary engagement against pro-Russian separatism 
in Georgia, indirect support for pro-Russian separatism in Transnistria, and participation in anti-
Russian separatism in Chechnya. 
 
With the rise of Putin and accompanying change in Russian foreign policy since 2000, the stakes of 
the -Western 
bureaucracy and t -governmental nationalists began to see Ukraine even more 
-Kremlin forces 
fair, aimed to 
discredit the Orange movement that was to bring Yushchenko to power. 
 
-
far right to position itself anew vis-à-vis the West and Russia. Korchyns
ultra-
neo-fascist points of view, such a n
-Ukrainian neo-Eurasianists. 
 
At about the same time, some pro-Russian forces within Ukraine saw the Svoboda party as an 
opportunity to influence Ukrainian politics. They began what seemed like a counterintuitive 
promotion in the Ukrainian media of the radically anti-Russian party in order to bolster their cause 
Svoboda had the potential to play many positive roles for Ukrainian 
pro-Moscow 
(b) an ultra-nationalist scarecrow for the West, and (c) a convenient sparring partner in various 
political competitions, especially during a presidential election. Possibly at the advice of Paul 
media empires to promote the rise of Svoboda.  
 
Svoboda started to benefit both 
directly and indirectly from the manipulations by the new president, his government, and the Party 
62 
 
that had been helping Svoboda since approximately 2009 led to its most successful electoral 
performance to date in the 2012 parliamentary elections. 
 
Svoboda -Russian party  go beyond the 
direct and indirect support it received until 2013 from the pro-Russian Party of Regions. It also 
built a multitude of foreign relations with once latently and later manifestly Russophile far-right 
parties in East-Central and Western Europe. 
start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, both of these developments came to an abrupt halt. 
Svoboda Svoboda
partners became, in view of their demonstrative pro-Putinist coming-outs since 2014, sources of 
 
 
ry and Russian-Ukrainian war opened in 2014 a new chapter of history 
leading to a realignment within the Russian far right that split along the lines of supporters and 
enemies of Ukrainian territorial integrity and national independence. As a result, a number of pro-
Ukrainian Russian ultra-nationalists moved to Ukraine. In certain cases, they turned into armed 
fighters, joining the fight for Ukrainian sovereignty in the Donbas. Some also managed to integrate 
into the newly emerging Azov movement.  
 
The Russian-Ukrainian war has also meant that open contacts between Ukrainian nationalists and 
Russian actors -2007 have 
become impossible. Nevertheless, the Azov movement has come to occupy a new niche in absorbing 
many Russian émigré ultra-nationalists into its various armed and unarmed wings as well as its 
front organization, the Russian Center. The Azov movement also had or still has a peculiar 
relationship with politically ambivalent journalists, including Anatoliy Shariy and Dmytro Hordon, 
as well as with TV channels under the control of pro-Moscow oligarchs like Viktor Medvedchuk. The 
benevolent treatment of the Azov movement by these media actors was and still is in stark contrast 
to these ou Svoboda, the Right Sector, and other Ukrainian ultra-
nationalist groups.  
 
-technologic
question. There could be a coordinated scheme behind the disproportionate public presence of the 
marginal Azov group, which garners electoral support around or below one percent. If such a secret 
operation were true, the scheme would resemble the phenomenon of the unusual high publicity of 
Svoboda on popular talk shows from 2010 to 2012.  
 
The ambivalent domestic stance of the National Corps is, in some regards, paralleled by 
considerable ambiguity in the foreign relations that the movement has been building aggressively 
larger European far-right subcultural milieu. In its multi-faceted efforts to join with other European 
actors, the National Corps and its related NGOs, like Svoboda before 2014, entered into 
relationships with European partners that occupy ambivalent or even affirmative positions vis-à-
Svoboda rtners before 2014, 
-fascist political 
groupuscules and relatively closed racist subcultures. These circles, unlike the parties in the former 
AENM, do not have much electoral potential or political weight, and are largely unknown to the 




Using post-Soviet Ukraine as an example, our study illustrates the geographically broader, 
politically general, and, perhaps, altogether trivial observation that for young nation states ultra-
nationalism is in some regards an even more problematic enterprise than for older countries. It is 
not only normatively destructive, potentially criminal, and internally subversive,293 but the 
fanaticism of ultra-
is, like Ukraine today, in a confrontation with an aggressive neighbor. Ultra-nationalists like to be 
organizations as Svoboda, Bratstvo, and Azov are, however, more complicated and often 
contradictory. 
 
While such a conclusion is, in its substance, rather unsurprising, it has a strategic dimension worth 
noting. Our study indicates that seemingly pragmatic alignments between moderate and radical 
nationalists, such as the cross-factional anti-Yanukovych Committee Against Dictatorship that 
included Svoboda, can turn out to be problematic for democratic parties engaged in this type of 
cooperation. Such alliances across the dividing line between democratism and anti-democratism 
come with various risks due to ultra- -democratic 
values.294  
 
Radical political forces may often be ready to shape their foreign relations in more adventurous and 
less restrictive manners than their moderate counterparts. The latter frequently belong to 
relatively large and stable international party families or networks that partially pre-frame the 
direction of their foreign contacts and partnerships. In contrast, far-
can be erratic, as the example of post-Soviet Ukrainian far right groups highlighted here shows. 
Moderate political allies of radical nationalists may become hostages of their 
allegiance to constitutional procedures. 
 
Center-right parties can find themselves in situations where they become discredited by the 
dubious foreign connections of their radical domestic allies. The ultra-
contacts abroad sometimes has little to do with a particular ideological stance. It may instead be the 
result of the fact that extremist parties operate within different international contexts and 
behavioral frames than moderate political forces. Extremists may not be particularly picky or 
sufficiently risk averse when building their foreign partnerships. The above story of Ukrainian 
ultra-nationalist connections to Russia as well as to various pro-Kremlin actors in Ukraine and 
elsewhere illustrates this facet of the international relations of the worldwide far right. 
 
293 Larger comparative studies of the European far right that, unlike most other such explorations, include the 
Ukrainian case are: Sabrina Ramet, ed., The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989  (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Anton Shekhovtsov, 
 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2011); Alina 
Polyakova, The Dark Side of European Integration: Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of 
Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2015); Michael Minkenberg, ed., 
Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process  (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 2015); Lenka Bustikova, Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe  
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
294 -consider the Inclusion of Svoboda into the CAD: Open Letter to the Leaders of Ukraine's Democratic 
Opposition Regarding 
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